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What will happen after District of Columbia v. Heller? We know that five
justices on the Supreme Court now oppose comprehensive federal prohibitions on
home handgun possession by some class of trustworthy homeowners for the purpose
of, and maybe only at the time of, self-defense. Perhaps the justices will push fur-
ther and apply Heller's holding to state and local governments via the Fourteenth
Amendment. But the majority opinion in Heller offered limited guidance for
future cases. It did not follow a purely originalist method of constitutional interpre-
tation, nor did it establish a constraining doctrinal framework for evaluating
firearms regulation-although the opinion did gratuitously suggest that much existing
gun control is acceptable. There is significant room for judges to maneuver after
Heller. In the absence of more information from the Supreme Court, we identify
plausible legal arguments for the next few rounds of litigation and assess the stakes
for social welfare.
Based on available data, we conclude that some salient legal arguments after
Heller have little or no likely consequence for social welfare. For example, the
looming constitutional fight over local handgun bans-an issue on which we
present original empirical data-seems largely inconsequential. The same can be said
for a right to carry a firearm in public with a permit. On the other hand, less
prominent legal arguments could be quite threatening to social welfare. At some
point judges might draw on free speech doctrine and presumptively disfavor
taxation or regulation targeted especially at firearms. This could have serious
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consequences. In addition, and perhaps most important, Second Amendment
doctrine might deter innovative regulatory responses to the problem of gun violence.
The threat of litigation may inhibit useful policy experimentation ranging from
personalized firearms technology and the microstamping of shell casings, to pre-market
review of gun design, social-cost taxation, gun-owner insurance requirements,
and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
judicial opinions on supreme law, no matter how backward-looking their
reasoning might appear, are occasions to look forward. They indicate the
position of today's judges on issues faced by other institutions, and they signify
commitments that these judges are most unwilling to revise. On the other
hand, no opinion can fully chart the future path of judicial doctrine any more
than regulatory, statutory, or constitutional text can provide undisputed
guidance to all readers. Each of these texts must be used by decisionmakers in
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the future. In fact, the identity of the relevant decisionmakers is bound to
change over time, with no guarantee that the new group will mimic the
judgments of the old.
Our goal is to consider the plausible future of gun regulation after District
of Columbia v. Heller.' Heller actually decided little about the Second
Amendment's scope or implementing doctrine. The majority opinion estab-
lishes that a certain class of trustworthy citizens has a judicially enforceable right
to an operable handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense-perhaps
only at the time of self-defense-as against a flat federal ban on handgun
possession. The holding leaves many questions undecided. Nor was this
case the best test of judicial courage. Opinion polls showed large national
majorities opposing such bans.? Equally telling, majorities in the United
States Senate and House signed an amicus brief arguing that the District's
regulations were unconstitutional.! Thus the political environment intimated
little resistance to the narrow outcome in Heller.' And after 50,000 words of
argument, counterargument, and apparent compromise, the justices delivered not
much more than a new beginning for Second Amendment arguments in court.'
Understanding the hazards of prediction under these circumstances,
we attempt a realistic assessment from a social welfare perspective. Our
interest is in policy that best serves the overall welfare of the public,
including both gun owners and those at risk from gun-related crimes and
accidents. We care about judicial decisions that may advance or retard
such policymaking, but we are less interested in evaluating the Supreme
Court's work according to conventional standards of legal argument or ideal
theories of constitutional interpretation. We would investigate the social
welfare consequences of judicially enforceable gun rights even if these rights
1. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. See infra Part IL.A (discussing readings of Heller's holding).
3. See Lydia Saad, Shrunken Majority Now Favors Stricter Gun Laws, GALLUP NEWS SERV.,
Oct. 11, 2007, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/101731/Shrunken-Majority-Now-Favors-
Stricter-Gun-Laws.aspx.
4. See Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of United States Senate, the President of the
United States Senate, and 250 Members of United States House of Representatives in Support of
Respondent, at app. la-10a, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290)
[hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae]. Given their opposition to the District's regulation, one
might ask why these legislators did not prefer to legislate. For a partial answer to this question, see
infra note 250.
5. Although neither major party candidate for president took issue with Heller's outcome
after the fact, see 2008central.net, McCain and Obama Statements on DC v. Heller, June 26,
2008, http://2008central.net/2008/06/26/mccain-and-obama-statements-on-dc-v-heller, it is worth
noting that John McCain signed the aforementioned amicus brief while Barack Obama did not.
See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 4, at app. la-3a.
6. See infra notes 138-141 (collecting examples of litigation in Heller's wake).
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were plainly dictated by justified fidelity to the true meaning of the Constitution,
and even if such rights ought to be understood as trumping any further cost-
benefit analysis.'
Although this social welfare perspective is wide-ranging in some respects,
it leads us to significant-and perhaps surprising-conclusions about the
future of sound gun control policy. To be sure, some of the constitutional
questions emerging after Heller will be relevant to good public policy. The
majority's list of "presumptively" valid regulations will have to be confirmed,'
and its view of Second Amendment rights might be extended to state and
local governments. These legal questions are obvious and worth debating. But
certain Second Amendment issues that are likely to be litigated in the near
future might be largely irrelevant to social welfare. An example is the
looming fight over state and local handgun bans-an issue on which we
present some original empirical data-and the possibility of a qualified
Second Amendment right to carry a firearm in public with a permit. On the
other hand, some legal questions that have received less attention might
have much higher stakes from a social welfare perspective. An example is the
validity of firearms taxes or safety programs developed especially for
firearms. Finally, Heller might be used to dampen enthusiasm for innovative
responses to the ongoing clash of gun rights advocates and gun control
proponents. We will briefly discuss this concern, along with a faint hope
for a better result.9
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Part I offers some data on gun
ownership in the United States and a sketch of the country's gun control
regime before Heller. Part II explains what was decided and left open by the
majority's opinion, and discusses various models that the Supreme Court
7. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153, 158,
165-66 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
8. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 & n.26 (2008); see infra text
accompanying note 130.
9. This Article relies on many empirical studies. They will be unfamiliar to most lawyers,
and some readers might wish to minimize the studies' value for constitutional decisionmaking.
Indeed, the facial plausibility of the data might be influenced by the reader's feelings about gun
control. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense,
45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2008). But for our purposes, these empirical studies are essential.
We have made best efforts to accurately recount the findings therein and to draw only logically
supportable conclusions therefrom. The data will not, however, perfectly measure the psychological or
emotional impact of gun rights and gun ownership. The happiness, satisfaction, fear, and distress
arising from the prevalence of guns in America are difficult to measure precisely.
Note also that judicial understandings of constitutional rights can influence the rendering of
ordinary law. Statutory interpretation may be influenced by constitutional doubt, and Heller might
instigate new constitutional doubt when courts interpret statutes. We set aside the difficult project of
predicting and estimating these effects after Heller.
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has used to modulate supreme judicial review in other fields. Part III
considers potential consequences of continued judicial oversight of firearms
regulation. Much of the analysis is provisional, but we suggest danger zones
where aggressive judicial intervention would most likely result in troubling
consequences for social welfare. We also identify disputes that seem unimpor-
tant to social welfare based on current knowledge. The analysis closes with
a brief discussion of the potentially complex relationship between judicial
review and innovation in gun control.
I. GUNs, RISKS, AND REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATESo
A. Gun Ownership
In America, gun ownership is concentrated. Our best estimate is that
there are 200-250 million firearms in private circulation," meaning that there
are nearly enough guns for every adult to have one. But about 75 percent of
all adults do not own any guns.12 Recent survey data suggests that about 42
percent of males, 9 percent of females, and 35 percent of all households
have at least one gun. 3 It seems that the prevalence of gun ownership by
10. This Part draws on material from Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Social Costs of Gun
Ownership, 90 J. PUB. EcoN. 379 (2006).
11. This estimate is based on two sources: federal tax records on sales and a survey. First,
the number of new guns added each year is taken from tax data kept by the federal government on
manufactures, imports, and exports. The annual count of net additions can be cumulated over, for
example, the last century, with some assumption about the rate of removal through such
mechanisms as off-the-books exports, breakage, and police confiscation. See GARY KLECK,
TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 63-64 (1997); Philip J. Cook, The
Technology of Personal Violence, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 37-38
(Michael Tonry ed., 1991). The second basis for estimating the stock is the one-time National
Survey of the Personal Ownership of Firearms (NSPOF), conducted in 1994. This is the only survey
that has attempted to determine the number of guns in private hands. A number of other surveys, includ-
ing the General Social Survey, provide an estimate of the prevalence of gun ownership among
individuals and households but do not attempt to determine the average number of guns per gun
owner. "The NSPOF estimate for the number of guns in 1994 was 192 million, a number that is
compatible with the 'sales accumulation' method, assuming that just 15 percent of the new guns
sold since 1899 have been discarded or destroyed." Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Aiming for
Evidence-Based Gun Policy, 25 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691, 699 n.9 (2006). Since the
NSPOF survey, the annual rate of net additions to the gun stock has been about 4-5 million per
year, or 50-60 million by 2006. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, FIREARMS
COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES exhibits 1-3 (2002). Given a continued removal rate of just
1 percent, the stock as of 2006 would be about 220 million.
12. See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 12 tbl.2.3 (1996).
13. See id. at 14, 32.
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household has been in long-term decline," partly because households are
becoming smaller and less likely to include an adult male. On the other
hand, most people who own one gun own many. In 1994, about 75 percent
of all guns were owned by those who owned four or more, and this slice of
gun owners amounted to only 10 percent of the adult population."
Firearms ownership is not only concentrated but also associated with
particular geographic locations and socioeconomic indicators. The prevalence
of gun ownership differs widely across regions, states, and localities, as well
as across different demographic groups. For example, while it appears that
about 13 percent of Massachusetts households own a gun, a full 60 percent
of Mississippi households own one." Residents of rural areas and small
towns are far more likely to own a gun than residents of large cities, partly
because of the importance of hunting and sport shooting in those communi-
ties." And this geographic skew is consistent with a concentration of ownership
among middle-aged, middle-income households." These attributes are
associated with relatively low involvement in criminal violence," and it is
reasonable to suppose that most guns are in the hands of people who are
unlikely to misuse them. Still, gun owners as a group are more likely than
other adults to have a criminal record.zo
Of the subset of Americans who own firearms, handguns are somewhat
popular but by no means the dominant type of weapon. Around 33 percent
of America's privately held firearms are handguns, which are more likely
than long guns to be kept for defense against crime.2 1 In the 1970s, about
33 percent of new guns were handguns, a figure which grew to nearly 50
14. See id. at 9; TOM W. SMITH, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REGULATION OF
FIREARMS fig.2 (2007).
15. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 12, at 13-14, 32.
16. See Deborah Azrael, Philip J. Cook & Matthew Miller, State and Local Prevalence of
Firearms Ownership: Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 43,
app. at 58-59 tbl.AIV (2004).
17. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 12, at 31-32, 50 tbl.5.6.
18. Id. at 32-35.
19. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERvs. Div., U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
2007, tbl.38 (2008), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_38.html (indicating that only about 23
percent of violent crimes are committed by people between ages thirty and forty-nine); Ching-Chi
Hsieh & M.D. Pugh, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Violent Crime: A Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate
Data Studies, 18 CRIM. JUST. REV. 182, 198 (1993) (showing a correlation between poverty, income
inequality, and violent crime).
20. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 12, at 35.
21. See id. at 13 (noting that, according to the NSPOF estimate, sixty-five million of the
total 192 million privately owned firearms are handguns); id. at 39 tbl.4.6 (noting that 74.4
percent of handgun owners own a gun for self defense, while 14.9 percent of long gun owners own
a gun for self defense).
1046 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1041 (2009)
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percent by the early 1990s and then fell back to around 40 percent by the
end of that decade.22 Despite the long-term increase in the relative importance
of handgun sales, a mere 20 percent of gun-owning individuals have only
handguns; 44 percent have both handguns and long guns, reflecting the fact
that most people who have acquired guns for self-protection are also hunters
and target shooters." Less than 50 percent of gun owners say that their primary
21
motivation for having a gun is self-protection against crime.
Most Americans get their guns from regulated dealers, but a significant
number of acquisitions are either less regulated or criminal. The majority of
guns acquired in a recent two year period were obtained by their owners
directly from a federally licensed firearm dealer (FFL). 25 However, the 30 to 40
percent of all gun transfers that do not involve licensed dealers-the so-called
secondary market 26-accounts for most guns used in crime. 27  Despite the
prominence of gun shows in contemporary policy debates, the best available
evidence suggests that such shows account for only a small share of all secon-
dary market sales. 28 Another important source of crime guns is theft. Over
500,000 guns are stolen each year.29
B. Gun Violence
Including homicide, suicide, and accidental deaths, 30,694 Americans
died by gunfire in 2005.30 This amounts to a gun-related mortality rate of
10.4 deaths per 100,000 people for the year." The mortality rate is down
22. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE
UNITED STATES 7 fig.5 (2000) (dating the decline at 1997).
23. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 12, at 39 tbl.4.6.
24. See id. at 38.
25. See id. at 26.
26. See Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi, & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59 (1995).
27. See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A
SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 4 (expanded ed. 1994); Philip J. Cook & Anthony A.
Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms
Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277, 291-92 (2001); see also JOSEPH F. SHELEY & JAMES D. WRIGHT, IN
THE LINE OF FIRE: YOUTH, GUNS, AND VIOLENCE IN URBAN AMERICA 46-50 (1995) (identifying
non-dealer sources for acquisition of guns by juveniles).
28. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 12, at 25 tbl.3.1 1.
29. See id. at 41; KLECK, supra note 11, at 90.
30. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Injury Prevention &
Control, WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999-2006, [hereinafter WISQARS], available at
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortratel0_sy.html (last visited May 23, 2009).
31. See id.
1047Gun Control After Heller
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substantially from 1990, when it was 14.9 per 100,000, but is still much
higher than the observed rate in, say, 1950.2
Intentional violence is the major exception to the general decline in
death by injury during the last fifty years." More Americans die each year by
gun suicide than gun homicide. However, more people suffer nonfatal gun
injuries from crime than from unsuccessful suicide attempts." The case fatality
rate, which is much higher for attempted suicide than for gunshot wounds from
criminal assaults, accounts for this difference. In addition, about eight hundred
people per year die from unintentional gunshot injuries, although this figure is
heavily influenced by coroners' standards concerning what constitutes an
accident as opposed to a homicide or suicide. 6
Although everyone shares in the costs of gun violence to some extent,
the shooters and victims are not a representative slice of the population. In
2005, the gun homicide victimization rate for Hispanic men ages 18-29 was
six times the rate for non-Hispanic white men of the same age.37 And the
gun homicide rate for black men in this age group-99 per 100,000-was a
remarkable twenty-four times the rate for white males in the same age
group." In addition, there appears to be considerable overlap between the
populations of potential offenders and victims: The large majority of both
groups have prior criminal records.3 ' The demographics of gun suicide look
somewhat different. While suicides and homicides both occur dispropor-
32. See NAT'L OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1950, at 74-75 (1950), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/vsus/VSUS_1950_3.pdf; PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL
COSTS 19 fig.2.2 (2000).
33. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 32 at 21-27.
34. See MELONIE P. HERON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS: DEATHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2006, at 20 (2008),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_16.pdf.
35. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention & Nat'l Ctr. for Injury Prevention & Control,
WISQARS Nonfatal Injuries: Nonfatal Injury Reports, available at http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/
ncipc/nfirates.html (last visited May 23, 2009).
36. See HERON ET AL., supra note 34, at 19 tbl.2 (reporting data); Ctrs. for Disease Control
& Prevention, Operational Criteria for Determining Suicide, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 773, 773, 779 (1988), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwR/preview/mmwrhtml/00001318.htm
(observing that coroner standards for identifying suicides vary and may be error-prone).
37. See WISQARS, supra note 30.
38. See id.
39. See Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Anthony A. Braga, Criminal Records of Homicide Offenders,
294 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 598 (2005); David M. Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl & Anthony A. Braga, Youth
Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1996, at 147, 191 tbl.2; Michael D. McGonigal et al., Urban Firearm Deaths: A Five-
Year Perspective, 35 J. TRAUMA 532 (1993); Don B. Kates & Daniel D. Polsby, The Myth of the "Virgin
Killer": Law-Abiding Persons Who Kill in a Fit of Rage 19 (2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.hoffmang.com/firearms/kates/Myth of the VirginKiller-Kates-Polsby.pdf.
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tionately among those with low incomes or educational attainment, gun
suicides are more common among whites than blacks, and more common
among the old than among young or middle-aged adults."o Men are vastly
overrepresented in all categories.
However, the costs of gun violence to society are more evenly distributed
across the population than victimization statistics might suggest. The
threat of being shot prompts private citizens and public institutions to undertake
a variety of costly measures to reduce this risk, and many people live with
anxiety arising from the lingering chance that they or a loved one could be
shot. As one local district attorney notes, "Gun violence is what makes people
afraid to go to the corner store at night."" As a result, the threat of gun vio-
lence in some neighborhoods is an important disamenity that depresses property
values and economic development. Gun violence, then, is a multifaceted
problem that has notable effects on public health, crime, and living standards.
While quantifying the magnitude of these social costs is difficult, one
contingent-valuation (CV) survey estimate found that the costs of gun
violence were on the order of $100 billion in 1995.42 Most of these costs ($80
billion) come from crime-related gun violence." Dividing by the annual
number of crime-related gunshot wounds, including homicides, implies a
social cost per crime-related gun injury of around $1 million."
40. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 32, at 23-24.
41. J.M. Kalil, New Approach: Prosecutors Take Aim at Gun Crimes, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Mar. 8, 2002, at IB.
42. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 32, at 11.
43. See id. at 10.
44. See Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, The Benefits of Reducing Gun Violence: Evidence From
Contingent-Valuation Survey Data, 22 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 207, 213-14 (2001). This estimate
is intended to capture the costs of gun misuse and so ignores the benefits to society of widespread
gun ownership-in the same way that studies of the social costs of automobile accidents ignore
the benefits of driving. The figure comes, in part, from contingent-valuation (CV) responses
about what people say they would pay to reduce crime-related gun violence by 30 percent. One
potential concern is that these estimates assume that societal willingness to pay to reduce gun
violence is linear with the proportion of gun violence eliminated, which may not be the case.
And in practice there remains some uncertainty about the reliability of the CV measurement
technology. In any case, most of the estimated costs of gun violence in the United States appear
to come from crime, insofar as suicide is treated as a private concern, and the estimated costs of
gun crime fits comfortably next to more recent CV estimates for the social costs of crime more
generally. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 32, at 10-11; see also Mark A. Cohen et al.,
Willingness-to-Pay for Crime Control Programs, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 89, 105 (2004).
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C. Gun Regulation by Ordinary Law
While far less stringent than regulation in other wealthy nations,5
state and federal law in the United States regulates most aspects of firearms
commerce and possession. It should be noted here, however, that gun
regulation in the United States is almost entirely a product of legislation
rather than rulemaking processes in administrative agencies. The latter
would tend to place greater demands on the decisionmakers to solicit alternative
viewpoints and to show a serious consideration of costs and benefits. The
legislative process tends to have no such formal requirements before enactment.
1. Interstate Transactions and Access Restrictions
The balance between benefit and cost in gun possession and regulation
differs widely across states. Accordingly, a primary objective of federal gun
regulation is to minimize policy spillover across state lines. Federal law aims
to ensure that stringent regulations on firearms commerce in some states are
not undercut by relatively lax regulation in other states." The citizens of
rural Montana understandably favor a more permissive system than those
living in Chicago, and both can be accommodated if transfers between
them are effectively limited. In response to such concerns, the Gun Control
Act of 1968" established the framework for the current system of controls
on gun transfers. All shipments of firearms, including mail-order sales, are
limited to federally licensed dealers. These dealers are required to obey
applicable state and local ordinances and to observe certain restrictions on
sales of guns to out-of-state residents."
In addition to controlling regulatory spillover between states, federal
law establishes a national regulatory floor of restrictions on the acquisition
and possession of guns. Thus, the Gun Control Act specifies several categories
of people who are denied the right to receive or possess a gun, including:
illegal aliens; people convicted of a felony or an act of domestic violence;
people under indictment; illicit drug users; and those who have at some
45. See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNs, PUBLic HEALTH 2-3 (2004).
46. See Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 133, 175 (1975).
47. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 902, 82 Star. 226 (1968) & Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat.
1214 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (2006)).
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)-(e) (2006). The McClure-Volkmer Amendment of 1986 eased
the restriction on out-of-state purchases of rifles and shotguns. Id. §H 922-923. Such purchases
are now legal as long as they comply with the regulations of both the buyer's state of residence and
the state in which the sale occurs.
1050 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1041 (2009)
HeinOnline  -- 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1050 2008-2009
time been involuntarily committed to a mental institution." In addition,
federally licensed dealers may not sell handguns to people younger than age
twenty-one, or long guns to those younger than eighteen."o Dealers are required
to ask for identification from all would-be buyers, have them sign a form
indicating that they are not within a proscribed category, and initiate a
criminal history check." Finally, dealers are required to keep a record of each
completed sale and to cooperate with authorities when they need to access
those records for gun-tracing purposes.52
Notably omitted from federal regulation are gun sales by people not in
the business. Such sellers, whether at a gun show or elsewhere, may transfer
a gun without keeping a record of sale or performing a background check."
This private sale loophole is a major gap in federal regulation and helps the
used-gun market thrive.
State regulation provides another layer of restrictions on transfer,
possession, and use of firearms. Twelve states require handgun buyers to
obtain a permit or license before taking possession, a process that typically
entails a fee and a waiting period." All but a few of these transfer-control
systems are permissive, however, in that most people are legally entitled to
obtain a gun. In the few permitting and licensing jurisdictions that do not
have permissive standards, including Massachusetts and New York City, it
is difficult to obtain a handgun legally. Chicago and Washington, D.C.
have largely prohibited handgun ownership as a matter of formal law since
1982 and 1976, respectively-although the District's handgun ban became
unenforceable in at least some circumstances after Heller." State legislatures
have enacted a variety of more modest restrictions on firearms commerce as
well. For example, California, Maryland, and Virginia bar dealers from selling
more than one handgun a month to any one buyer."
49. See id. § 922(d)(1), (3), (4), (5)(A), (9).
50. See id. § 922(b)(1).
51. See id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(1), (s)(3)(A)-(B), (t)(1).
52. See id. § 923(g)(1)(A)-(B); LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS
IN AMERICA: AN EVALUATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND
SELECTED LOCAL GUN LAWS 86 (2006) thereinafter LCAV REPORT]; Jon S. Vernick & Stephen
P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1193, 1195-96 (2000).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) (2006).
54. See LCAV REPORT, supra note 52, at 113-18.
55. See infra Part IL.A-II.B. On the District's revised rules, see infra note 118.
56. See CAL. PENAL CODE H§ 12072(a)(9), (c)(6), 12071(b)(7)(F) (West Supp. 2009);
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
308.2:2(P) (Supp. 2008); see also LCAV REPORT, supra note 52, at 140-41.
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2. Gun Design
Federal law also imposes some restrictions on gun design, and certain
types of firearms are effectively prohibited. The National Firearms Act of
1934 (NFA)" was intended to eliminate Prohibition-era gangster firearms,
including sawed-off shotguns, hand grenades, and automatic weapons capable
of continuous rapid fire with a single pull of the trigger." All such weapons
had to be registered with the federal government and transfers were subject to
a tax of $200," which at the time of enactment was confiscatory. While
some of these weapons have remained in legal circulation, the NFA-now
amended to ban the introduction of new weapons of this sort'-appears
to have been quite effective at reducing the use of automatic weapons in crime."
Furthermore, the Gun Control Act of 1968 included a ban on the
import of small, cheap handguns,62 sometimes known as "Saturday Night
Specials." This ban uses criteria to assign points to a gun model depending
on its size and other qualities.6 ' Handguns that fail to achieve a minimum
score on the factoring criteria, or that fail to meet size and safety criteria,
cannot be imported. However, domestic manufacturers may lawfully assemble
guns, often from imported parts, that would fail the factoring criteria. This
market niche has been well supplied. One study found that one-third of
new domestically manufactured handgun models did not meet the size or quality
requirements applied to imports.'
In 1994, Congress temporarily banned the importation and manufacture
of certain assault weapons (military-style semi-automatic firearms). The Crime
Control Act banned nineteen such weapons by name, and others were
57. See 26 U.S.C §§ 5801-72 (2006).
58. See id. § 5845.
59. See id. § 5811.
60. See id. § 5861.
61. See GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 67-70 (1991).
62. See Philip J. Cook, Mark H. Moore & Anthony A. Braga, Gun Control, in CRIME:
PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL 291, 312 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002);
Zimring, supra note 46, at 154-56. "An important loophole allowed the import of parts of handguns
that could not meet the 'sporting purposes' test of the Gun Control Act. This loophole was closed
by the McClure-Volkmer Amendment of 1986." Cook, Moore & Braga, supra at 291, 616 n.24.
63. See Zimring, supra note 46, at 165; see also TRUDY A. KARLSON & STEPHEN W.
HARGARTEN, REDUCING FIREARM INJURY AND DEATH: A PUBLIC HEALTH SOURCEBOOK ON
GUNS 74 (1997) (listing some of the factoring criteria for imported guns).
64. See John S. Milne et al., Effect of Current Federal Regulations on Handgun Safety Features,
41 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 1, 5 (2003); see also GAREN WINTEMUTE, RING OF FIRE: THE
HANDGUN MAKERS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 11-17 (1994).
65. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-122, 108
Stat. 1796 (repealed 2004).
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outlawed if they possessed some combination of design features such as a
detachable magazine, barrel shroud, or bayonet mount.' The Act also banned
manufacture and import of magazines holding more than ten rounds." However,
then-existing assault weapons and large-capacity magazines were grandfathered.'
And in 2004, the ban was allowed to expire."
Aside from these design prohibitions, federal law has been permissive. It
leaves unregulated those types of firearms that are not specifically banned.
Furthermore, firearms and ammunition are excluded from the purview of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, and no federal agency is responsible
for reviewing the design of firearms."o Nor is any mechanism in place for
identifying unsafe models that could lead to a recall and correction."
But some states have acted independently. In 2000, the Massachusetts
Attorney General announced that firearms would henceforth be regulated
by a state agency with jurisdiction over other consumer products, and firearms
judged unacceptable would be taken off the market." Massachusetts is unique
in asserting broad state authority to regulate gun design and safety per se,
though a handful of other state legislatures have restricted the design of new
guns in more limited fashion. The first important instance occurred in
Maryland, which enacted its own ban on Saturday Night Specials." The
legislature was responding to a successful suit against a gun manufacturer. In
exchange for relieving manufacturers of small, cheap handguns from liabil-
ity, the legislature created a process for reviewing handgun designs and
specifying which models would be ruled out due to size and safety concerns."
As of 2008, eight states have some version of a ban on Saturday Night
66. See id. § 110102.
67. See id. § 110103(b)(31)(A).
68. See Christopher S. Koper & Jeffrey A. Roth, The Impact of the 1994 Federal Assault
Weapon Ban on Gun Violence Outcomes: An Assessment of Multiple Outcome Measures and Some
Lessons for Policy Evaluation, 17 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 33, 36 (2001).
69. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-122,
108 Stat. 1796 § 110105.
70. See Vernick & Teret, supra note 52, at 1196.
71. See COMM. ON INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, Div. OF HEALTH PROMOTION &
DISEASE PREVENTION, REDUCING THE BURDEN OF INJURY: ADVANCING PREVENTION AND
TREATMENT 126 (Richard J. Bonnie, Carolyn Fulco & Catharyn T. Liverman eds., 1999).
72. The new rules effectively ban Saturday Night Specials and require that handguns sold
in Massachusetts include childproof locks, tamper-proof serial numbers, and safety warnings. The
new gun safety regulations affect manufacturers as well as retailers. See 940 MASS. CODE REGS.
16.01-09 (2008).
73. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-405 to -406 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2008).
74. See id. § 5-405; see also Jon S. Vernick et al., Effects of Maryland's Law Banning Saturday
Night Special Handguns on Crime Guns, 5 INJ. PREVENTION 259 (1999).
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Specials." California has also been active in recent years, instituting a ban on
assault weapons and establishing a number of handgun safety requirements.
3. Gun Possession and Use
States and some localities also specify the rules under which guns may
be carried in public. Every state except Alaska and Vermont places some restric-
tion on carrying a concealed firearm." However, the trend over the past several
decades has been to ease restrictions on concealed carry, replacing prohibition
with a permit system and easing the requirements to obtain a permit.
Currently, in most states adults who are entitled to possess a handgun can
obtain a permit to carry after paying a fee.
In addition, there has been some effort to regulate firearms storage.
Since 2005, federal law has required all handguns sold by licensed dealers to
come equipped with a secure storage device." Eleven states and the District
of Columbia have laws concerning firearm locking devices." Massachusetts
and the District require that all firearms be stored with a lock in place." And
the Maryland legislature recently adopted a pioneering requirement: All
handguns manufactured after 2003 and sold in the state must be "personalized"
with a built-in locking device that requires a key or combination to release.
4. Record Keeping
Some gun regulations are designed to assist law enforcement in solving
crimes. In particular, federal law requires that all licensees in the chain of
commerce-manufacturers, distributors, retail dealers-keep records of transfers
and provide them to law enforcement for tracing purposes." For example, if
a police department confiscates a firearm that may have been used in a crime,
it can submit a trace request through the National Tracing Center of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The ATF will
attempt to trace the chain of commerce using the serial number and other
75. See LCAV REPORT, supra note 52, at 145 (listing states that require "design and/or
safety standards" that serve to ban Saturday Night Specials).
76. See id. at 17, 146-48.
77. See id. at 136.
78. See id. at 132; JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME
AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 43 (2000).
79. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(z) (2006).
80. See LCAV REPORT, supra note 52, at xiii.
81. See id. at 152.
82. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-132 (LexisNexis 2003).
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
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characteristics of the gun. If all goes well, the retail dealer who first sold the
gun will be identified and will supply information from the form that the buyer
filled out. Unfortunately, this system is inefficient and error-prone, and
even if successful it usually leaves the investigators far short of the informa-
tion they really want: the identity of the most recent owner of the firearm."
But a more direct system of national registration has been politically impossible
to implement-except in the case of Title II weapons regulated by the National
Firearms Act of 1934," which include machine guns, sawed-off shotguns,
and grenades."
A few states do have registration requirements, however. California
requires registration of handgun transactions, even if they occur between private
parties." This requirement complements a new regulation that all semiauto-
matic pistols sold in the state after 2010 be designed with micro-stamp
capability. Microstamping means that the firearm will print the serial number,
make, and model of the gun on the shell casing when the gun is fired." Shell
casings are ejected from pistols and often left at the scene, where they can be
collected by investigators and, under the new law, used to initiate a trace even
when the gun itself is not in custody.
5. Mass Tort Litigation
Thus far, our regulatory review shows a baseline of federal legislation with
a second layer of state legislation which varies significantly across the country.
If the gun policy process is functioning well, the policy diversity we see should
reflect the different values and circumstances of different states. Yet much
differentiation in the cost-benefit balance for gun control occurs within states,
at the local level. Residents of heavily populated cities tend to suffer relatively
high rates of violent crime and have little interest in gun sports, while the
reverse is true in rural areas and small towns. As a result, the most extreme gun
control measures tend to be adopted by cities rather than states." But this
84. See Cook & Braga, supra note 27, at 301.
85. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-72 (2006).
86. See id.
87. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072(d) (West 2008).
88. See id. § 12126(b)(7).
89. See, e.g., Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends for
1970-1999, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 345, 363, 367
(Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (comparing numbers of gun laws at different levels of
government, and noting more restrictive regulation in certain Ohio cities than at the state level).
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degree of decentralized policymaking is often thwarted by state law: Over forty
states preempt at least some local laws affecting firearms.
In the 1990s, several cities facing tremendous costs from gun-related crime
tried an alternative. Frustrated by their inability to change gun regulations
through legislation, they filed mass tort lawsuits that had the potential to
impose higher standards of conduct on the gun industry. These suits asserted
unsafe and defective gun design under state law," or claimed that the industry
was creating a public nuisance through failure to police the supply chain by
which guns were marketed and often found their way into dangerous hands."
These suits were inspired by, and had parallels with, the lawsuits against the
cigarette industry filed by state attorneys general. The cigarette manufacturers
ultimately settled those suits, agreeing to restrictions on marketing practices
and to $240 billion in damages paid out over twenty-five years." One
difference is that in the gun industry suits most of the plaintiffs were cities
rather than states. Another difference is that the firearms industry is both
smaller and more diffuse than the tobacco industry, so that the financial stakes
were much lower. Indeed, the primary motivation for the municipal plaintiffs
was probably not money damages, but to force the gun industry to assume
greater responsibility for reducing the damage done with its products.
In any event, the cities' arguments did not fare well in court. A case
brought by New Orleans, for instance, was halted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court after that state's legislature enacted a statute barring such suits." Of
the city lawsuits, the "great majority have been dismissed or abandoned prior
to trial, and of the few favorable jury verdicts obtained by the plaintiffs, all
but one have been overturned on appeal. A handful of claims have been
settled prior to trial." 5
90. See James A. Beckman, Preemption Laws, in 2 GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 478, 478 (Gregg Lee Carter
ed., 2002).
91. See Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (La. 2001).
92. See City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004); Brian J.
Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for Reforming Gun Industry Misconduct,
18 ST. LOUis U. PUB. L. REv. 247, 248-49 (1999); see also Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New
Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms: Tort Litigation Against Fireanr Manufacturers and Constitutional
Challenges to Gun Laws, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1713, 1746-49 (1999). Thirty other cities and counties
filed suits against the gun industry, claiming negligence in marketing practices, product design, or
both. See generally Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction: An Overview of Lawsuits Against the Gun
Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 1, 1-35 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
93. See Milo Geyelin, Forty-Six States Agree to Accept $206 Billion Tobacco Settlement,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at Bl3.
94. See Morial, 785 So. 2d at 6.
95. Lytton, supra note 92, at 5.
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Then, on October 26, 2005, President George W. Bush signed the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA)." It provided an
important degree of legal immunity to the firearms industry, while preserving
the possibility of traditional tort actions against the industry. For example,
injuries from defects in design or manufacture can be compensated in private
suits. But the industry is now exempt from liability for injuries resulting
from criminal misuse of its product. While PLCAA might itself be subject
to constitutional challenge," efforts to enhance gun regulation through
litigation have failed for the most part. And today the litigation opportuni-
ties are running in the opposite direction.
11. HELLER AND THE NEXT LITIGATION FRONTIER
As of 2007, there was little else to say about the general character and
dynamics of gun control policy. Certainly federal constitutional litigation
was a matter of minimal significance. For most of our country's history, the
Second Amendment was absent from the Supreme Court's agenda. When
arguments based on the amendment reached the Court, they were ineffectual.
In the late 1800s, the Court confirmed that the amendment could not be used
to challenge state regulation.9 And in 1939, United States v. Miller" concluded
that the federal government was free to restrict possession of sawed-off
shotguns." Miller seemed to link Second Amendment rights to state
organized militias, rather than to individual preferences about gun ownership.
Lower federal courts followed this notion and the amendment was a dead
letter in litigation."0 '
Attraction to Second Amendment arguments gained strength in other
contexts, however. The gun rights movement made the amendment a
central rhetorical element in its organizing efforts.0 2 Many lawmakers were
96. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z) (2006).
97. See Timothy D. Lytton, Afterword: Federal Gun Industry Immunity Legislation, in SUING
THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 92, at 339, 339-54.
98. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 553 (1876).
99. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
100. See id. at 178 (seeking evidence that a sawed-off shotgun "has some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia").
101. See, e.g., Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1999). Results
from litigation involving state constitutions were not dramatically different. State supreme courts
invoked state gun rights to invalidate only a few state regulations after World War II. See Adam
Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 716-26 (2007).
102. For a view of the gun rights movement, political institutions, and Heller, see Reva B. Siegel,
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).
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sympathetic. And by the late twentieth century, scholarship on the amendment
was booming. Some legal academics supported an understanding of federal
gun rights beyond anachronistic state militias.'03 There were also judicial
rumblings. In 1997, Justice Thomas suggested that the amendment
might have provided another basis for invalidating the Brady Act's mandate
that local officials conduct background checks on handgun purchasers. 04 In
2001, a federal appeals court declared that the Second Amendment included a
personal right to keep and bear arms unrelated to militia service, although the
court upheld the regulation at issue.'os The United States Department of Justice
then amended its litigation position and endorsed the lower court's logic.' 6
A. Heller's Demilitarized Message
In 2008, the Supreme Court changed its message, too. District of Columbia
v. Heller'O7 became the first successful Second Amendment challenge in the
Court's history-a full 207 years after the amendment was ratified.o' This
time lag between ratification and adjudication must have influenced the
Court's decision. Notwithstanding a lengthy discussion of legal meaning as
it stood in 1791, crucial features of the majority opinion bend to develop-
103. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1139 (1996); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998). For contrary views from historians, see, for example, SAUL CORNELL, A
WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN
AMERICA 2-4, 7 (2006); Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000), reprinted in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 74, 113
(Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) ("[It is completely anachronistic to expect the disputants of the eighteenth
century to have comprehended, much less addressed, the problem of firearms regulation in its modem
form."). On competing theories for the gist of the amendment's meaning, see MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT
OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CANT END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS (2007).
104. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,938-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (joining the
majority opinion, which relied on federalism principles, but pointing to a Second Amendment argument).
105. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a conviction
for gun possession while the defendant was subject to a domestic violence restraining order), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 907 (2002).
106. See Memorandum from the Attorney General to All United States Attorneys (Nov. 9,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/emerson.htm. When Emerson sought review in
the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General abandoned the militia-related view of the amendment. See
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 20 n.3, United States v. Emerson, 536 U.S. 907 (2002)
(No. 01-8780) (accepting, however, "reasonable restrictions designed to prevent possession by unfit
persons or to restrict the possession of types of firearms that are particularly suited to criminal misuse").
107. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
108. For an analysis of such time lags, see Adam M. Samaha, Originalism's Expiration Date, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1308-10 (2008) (estimating the average lag between formal amendment and
Supreme Court interpretation at forty years).
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ments that occurred long after ratification. At the end of the day, the opinion
begins the process of accommodating an individualistic gun rights vision to
the modem tradition of gun regulation.
The case involved a police officer who wanted to keep an operable
handgun in his home and to "carry it about his home in that condition only
when necessary for self-defense."'" But the District was an urban jurisdiction
where the gun rights movement enjoyed little success in ordinary politics. One
District law prohibited possession of handguns by private citizens, with only
narrow exceptions."o A second regulation required all firearms to be either
unloaded and disassembled or trigger-locked at all times."' Exceptions were
made for law enforcement officers, places of business, and otherwise lawful
recreational activities,"2 but the regulation reached people's homes. A third
regulation involved firearms licensing by the chief of police."' The Heller
majority left unaddressed the issue of firearms licensing, but it concluded that
the first two regulations infringed the plaintiffs right to have a handgun in his
home for self-defense."'4
It is quite possible to read the majority opinion for very little. The
justices did not commit to restraining state or local firearms laws,"' which is
where much of the regulatory action takes place. Furthermore, the plaintiffs
position in Heller was relatively strong. The regulations under attack were
fairly broad, the argument came down to a qualified right to handgun
possession in the home, and the dissenting justices thought the amendment
was not even implicated without a militia connection."' Even under these
circumstances, the gun rights position only narrowly prevailed on a 5-4
vote. Perhaps a slightly different case would fracture the majority coalition.
After all, it does not take special courage to oppose flat handgun bans."'
One can easily imagine the 5-4 vote going the other way had the District
permitted a law-abiding citizen to store one handgun in the home, but required
109. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788 & n.2 (relating the lower court's understanding of the facts of
the case).
110. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2502.01 (LexisNexis 2008).
Ill. Id. § 7-2507.02.
112. See id.
113. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4506 (LexisNexis 2001).
114. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2819 (stating reasons for not addressing the issue of firearms licensing).
115. See id. at 2812-13 & n.23.
116. See id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. See supra notes 3-4 (citing polling and majority congressional opposition to flat handgun bans).
There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of judicial behavior which we will not delve into
here. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005). For the classic
view of the Court as sticking close to national governing coalitions, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
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handgun training, registration, and a trigger lock-except when and if self-
defense became necessary."'
Nevertheless, more significant lessons might be drawn. The first notable
feature of the majority opinion is the virtual irrelevance of militias to its view
of gun rights. The text of the Second Amendment begins with the preface,
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,...."
Whether or not this assertion is factually accurate, it could serve an important
role in understanding the words that follow: "the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." But for the majority, the amendment's
preface cannot be used to either limit or expand the meaning of the subsequent
words when read separately."9  Instead, the militia reference is supposed to
indicate the purpose of codifying a preexisting right of "the people" in general
to keep and bear arms."o Although the Amendment's ratification did follow a
debate over standing armies and the ability of state militias to check centralized
tyranny, the Heller majority contended that the codified right to keep and bear
arms was also valued for self-defense.121 This more personal self-defense function,
not the prerequisites of a robust citizen militia, defines the scope of the right
according to Heller.
Fencing off the amendment's judicially enforceable right from its
militia-oriented preface is revealing-and it cuts in two directions. Some of
the implications point toward judicial intervention. Private parties are now
allowed to raise Second Amendment arguments in court without showing
any relationship to a militia, state-run or otherwise. The content of the
right is personal and nonmilitary. As well, incorporation of Second
Amendment norms into the Fourteenth Amendment might seem easier
once the content of the former is separated from the preservation of state
militias. If the right is not about federal-state relations, it better resembles
the individual rights the Court has been willing to enforce against state and
local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment."'
118. The District's first temporary legislative reaction to Heller allowed registration of
handguns (excluding semi-automatics) for in-home self-defense (after a ballistics test), and
allowed trigger locks to be removed when the owner reasonably feared imminent harm in the home.
See Del Quentin Wilber & Paul Duggan, D.C. Is Sued Again Over Handgun Rules, WASH. POST,
July 29, 2008, at 301. The District's second round of temporary legislation can be found at Second
Firearms Control Emergency Act of 2008, available at http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/frames.asp?doc=/
mpdc/lib/mpdc/info/pdf/2ndFirearmsControl Act.pdf.
119. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792-97, 2789-90 nn.3-4.
120. See id. at 2800-02.
121. See id. at 2801-02.
122. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
499-507 (3d ed. 2006) (reviewing selective incorporation).
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But another implication involves judicial restraint. Ignoring the practical
needs of decentralized citizen militias allows courts to reject libertarian
demands for exceptionally potent firepower and to preserve the modem role of
government in law enforcement and national defense. The Heller majority is
not about to enforce any asserted right to frighten the United States armed
forces with overwhelming firepower. The majority's portrayal of the Second
Amendment right seems, at most, tangentially related to people protecting
themselves from the risks of centralized tyranny.123 Instead, the majority's
conception of the right is mainstreamed and demilitarized. In this respect, one
can say that Heller defanged the Second Amendment for litigation purposes.
B. Heller's Core Right and Suggested Limits
What, then, is the judicially enforceable right recognized in Heller?
The answer is debatable. Different readers will see the matter differently in the
absence of additional direction from the justices regarding what they meant
(or mean) to do. To make progress, however, we can look for Heller's minimum
plausible content. We can attempt to describe the core right to which a
majority of justices seem clearly committed.
Whatever else it might be made to include in the future, the majority's
core right involves self-defense with a typical handgun in one's home. These
justices were not interested in a right to carry arms "for any sort of confronta-
tion,"1 24 and declared that "self-defense ... was the central component of the
right" codified in the amendment.' And in explaining why the District's
handgun ban was defective, the majority stressed the confluence of three
factors: self-defense, handguns, and homes. It asserted that an inherent right of
self-defense has been central to the understanding of the Second Amendment
in American history, that handguns are now commonly chosen by Americans
for lawful self-defense, and that people's homes are where "the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute." For similar reasons,
the majority immunized the plaintiffs handgun from the District's requirement
that firearms in the home be kept inoperable at all times."
Hence the majority's core conception of the right seems to contemplate a
law-abiding citizen with a functional handgun in his own home for the pur-
123. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
124. Id. at 2799.
125. Id. at 2801.
126. Id. at 2817.
127. See id. at 2818 (referring to "the core lawful purpose" of self-defense).
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pose of defense, and perhaps only at the time of attack.128 This notion of
the right was strong enough to overcome an outright prohibition on possessing
a functional handgun in one's home at any time. And this description of
the right matches the situation of the actual plaintiff in Heller, who asked to
store an operable handgun in his home and to carry it there only when
necessary for self-defense.
In fact, limits were a theme in the majority opinion. These justices went
out of their way to suggest insulation for several forms of gun control not at issue
in the case. They conceded that the Second Amendment right is "not
unlimited,"l29 and offered a list of "presumptively lawful regulatory measures.',o
In crude terms, this nonexhaustive list includes regulation aimed at (1) atypical
weapons, (2) abnormal people, (3) sensitive locations, (4) sales conditions, (5)
safe storage, and, perhaps, (6) concealed carry. Although the matter is not
free from doubt, it appears that these presumptively valid regulations would
withstand a Second Amendment objection even to the extent that they
apply to handgun possession in the home for self-defense. Otherwise, Heller's
core right would seem "unlimited" in ways that the majority did not mean.
Thus the majority sought to protect weapons "typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens" for self-defense in the home,"' asserting that a limita-
tion to weapons in common use is consistent with a tradition of restricting
"dangerous and unusual weapons.""' Handguns are thereby covered in view
of their current popularity in the market,"' while the majority strongly
suggested that machine guns, M-16s, and sawed-off shotguns are not."' We
do not know the extent to which regulation may validly influence which
weapons become common. Such influence was implicitly tolerated by the
Heller majority because the mix of weapons purchased in contemporary
America is partly a function of the tax and regulatory policies discussed in
Part 1. In any event, a right restricted to the type of weapon owned by the
mainstream of armed home-defenders fits with the majority's demilitarized
vision of the amendment.
The discussion of other presumptively valid regulation was even more brief:
[Niothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
128. See id. at 2788, 2822.
129. Id. at 2816.
130. Id. at 2817 n.26.
131. Id. at 2815-16 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 2817.
133. See id. at 2817-18.
134. See id. at 2815, 2817.
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or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.'
Later, in distinguishing founding era regulation of gun powder storage, the
majority said its logic did not suggest problems with "laws regulating the storage
of firearms to prevent accidents.""' Finally, the majority observed that most
nineteenth-century cases had upheld prohibitions on concealed weapons.37
The opinion is, nevertheless, a litigation magnet. On the same day
that Heller was decided, suit was filed against the city of Chicago arguing that the
Heller right must be enforced against state and local action."' In another suit
that raises the incorporation question, gun show owners are using Heller to
challenge Alameda County's law against guns on county property."' And New
York City is now defending its handgun permit system, which critics argue is
too demanding and grants excessive discretion to the police department.'
Some criminal defendants are even objecting to the federal machine gun ban
and felon in possession convictions, despite the list of presumptively valid
regulations in Heller."' And some jurisdictions are avoiding the costs and risks
of litigation by repealing their handgun bans without a fight over incorpo-
ration.'42 In early 2009, San Francisco followed this course. It settled a gun
135. Id. at 2816-17.
136. Id. at 2820.
137. See id. at 2816. On unconcealed pistols, see infra Part III.C.
138. The Second Amendment Foundation maintains a website dedicated to the case. See
ChicagoGunCase.com, http://www.chicagoguncase.com (last visited May 23, 2009). Plaintiffs are
challenging Chicago's handgun ban, see CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c) (2008)
(noting exceptions), as well as the city's requirement that firearms be registered before acquisition
and then re-registered annually, see id. §H 8-20-090(a), 8-20-200. However, Chicago law seems to
differ from the District of Columbia's regime at issue in Heller, in that Chicago does not appear to man-
date a trigger lock on all firearms in the home at all times. Whether any such difference will
influence the outcome of litigation remains to be seen.
139. See Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457, 460 (9th Cit. 2009) (concluding that Second
Amendment rights are incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but then upholding this regulation of firearms on county property and stating that "the Ordinance
does not meaningfully impede the ability of individuals to defend themselves in their homes with
usable firearms, the core of the right as Heller analyzed it").
140. See Daniel Wise, Defense Lawyers Fire First Shot in Challenge to State Gun Law, N.Y. L.J.,
July 16, 2008, at 1.
141. These arguments have not been successful in lower federal courts, however. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App'x 383, 386 (9th Cit. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 613
(2008); United States v. Whisnant, No. 3:07-CR-32, 2008 WL 4500118, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept.
30, 2008) (collecting cases); see also Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551,
1564-66 (2009) (analyzing post- Heller lower court cases).
142. See Deborah Horan, Gun Bans Erode Under Pressure: Evanston Is the Latest to Repeal Its
Handgun Law, CHi. TRIB., Aug. 13, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
chi-gun-ban_13augl3,0,1421061.story. Prevailing plaintiffs may recover their attorney fees from
state and local defendants in federal constitutional litigation, but prevailing defendants normally
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rights lawsuit by agreeing to eliminate a lease provision for public housing ten-
ants that prohibited storage of firearms and ammunition.' The question
remains how the legal uncertainty will shake out.
C. Models for Judicial Review After Heller
Even with the majority's laundry list of presumptively valid regulations
in hand, there is no obvious theory by which to better specify the listed
items-or to add new items. Remember that the list is neither conclusive
nor exhaustive. Is the list governed by historical analogies and traditional
police powers? Can it be built into a general principle allowing "reasonable"
regulation? This is unsettled. Nor did the majority identify a generic test
that one should apply to determine whether the Second Amendment is
violated. Providing such guidance is not a requirement for case law and can
be difficult to do well in a single decision, but the absence of a prescribed
test leaves regulators guessing.
One possibility is that the Court will fashion additional rules based on
history and analogy. After all, the Heller majority devoted thousands of
words to an analysis of historical sources. These justices indicated that they
were investigating the ordinary meaning of the amendment's words to ordinary
citizens in 1791.'" Whatever version of originalism was on display, it was the
predominant mode of argument for the majority. In addition, the majority
rejected case-by-case balancing of competing interests within the perceived
"core protection" of the Second Amendment.' In contrast, Justice Breyer's
dissent advocated judicial balancing and considered much more than founding
era firearms regulation.'46 The majority responded, "[W]hatever else [the
amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense
of hearth and home.""' There is no hint here of judges asking whether a chal-
lenged regulation is justified by cost-benefit analysis or supported by reliable data.
cannot. See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 442,
462-63 (2001).
143. See Stipulation Regarding Settlement and Dismissal of Defendants San Francisco
Housing Authority and Henry Alvarez III Without Prejudice, Doe v. S.F. Hous. Auth., No. CV-
08-03112 TEH (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009) (continuing, however, to prohibit unlawful firearms and
ammunition possession), available at http://volokh.com/files/sfpublichousingguns.pdf.
144. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788, 2810 (2008). For a discussion of
different versions of originalism, see Samaha, supra note 108, at 1327-29.
145. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
146. See id. at 2847-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2821 (majority opinion); see also id. ("Constitutional rights are enshrined with
the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them .... ). Of course, a right's
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But other facets of Heller indicate the Court is not locked into strong
and rule-oriented originalism. As for hard-line rules over flexible standards,
the majority's repudiation of case-specific interest balancing was done with
reference to the "core protection" recognized in Heller."' Perhaps the
majority's inflexibility begins and ends with this core right, while some
brand of judicial cost-benefit analysis would be appropriate elsewhere, at
least at the periphery of Second Amendment values. As for originalism, it
was not the only form of analysis on display. Founding era historical sources
were not used to explain and probably cannot explain certain critical junctures
in the majority opinion.
Most notably, the majority's list of presumptively valid firearms regulation
was not supported with serious originalist investigation. In fact, the list was
not supported with much of any argument. It is quickly becoming one of
the most important features in the majority opinion, yet its foundation is far
easier to locate in contemporary political consensus or perhaps the necessity
of pragmatic compromise in building a five-vote coalition on the bench
than it is to support with eighteenth-century regulatory examples.
Equally important, the majority relied on sources far removed from
1791. Heller's rendition of nineteenth-century characterizations of the
Second Amendment stretched to include sources postdating ratification by
nearly 100 years."' These citations help us understand postenactment
traditions much better than they can reveal any settled meaning at the
founding. Using tradition to inform constitutional doctrine is also consistent
with the majority's reference to "longstanding" gun control in its preferred
list,5 o with its claim that the District's ban was more burdensome than others
in history,"' and with its reliance on an extended practice of prohibiting
unusual weapons.' While such analysis does involve history and analogy, it is
a departure from strong and pure originalism.
Judge-centered traditions played a role in the majority opinion as well.
For example, the majority claimed that the District's handgun ban flunked "any
of the standards of scrutiny that we [judges] have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights."' But no one asserts that these standards are dictated by
originally understood scope-to the extent that its meaning was determinate within the relevant
population at the relevant time-could include consideration of circumstances that may change
and authorize future decisionmakers to adjust in light of those changes.
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., id. at 2811-12.
150. See id. at 2816-17.
151. See id. at 2818.
152. See id. at 2817.
153. Id. at 2817-18.
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originalism alone. They are tests that courts developed to implement
constitutional norms.' The majority also made the effort to reconcile its
historical conclusions with the Court's meager case law regarding the Second
Amendment,'" which was unnecessary if only originalist history mattered.
And the majority cautioned that nineteenth-century precedent indicating
that gun rights are not enforceable against state action "did not engage in
the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases."' 6
Hence neither strong originalism nor strict rule-like doctrine has been
locked into place by Heller-surely not in the long run, possibly not for cases
outside of the core right now recognized, and perhaps not for the process of
defining limits on that core right. Only by word count is the Heller opinion
dominated by originalism.
If we are correct, the majority exhibited dependence on history without
prescribing any particular model for judicial review of Second Amendment
claims over the long term. And there is no consensus model that judges
could import from other fields of constitutional adjudication.
The truth is that judicial review is not a binary choice. Turning it on
does not determine exactly how it should be performed. Instead, making
judicial review operational requires choices along several dimensions, and it
implicates fundamental questions about the judicial role.
The first choice is whether any judicial oversight will take place. Some
clauses of the Constitution of the United States are never litigated (for
example, many provisions involving the structure of Congress) or are not
enforced by courts (for example, certain issues of impeachment).'" Some
clauses have been enforced against ordinary politics in one era only to be
largely ignored in another (for example, the Contracts Clause).
Among those constitutional norms that courts are comfortable enforcing,
judges have developed a variety of practices. Some domains are filled with
founding era history and analogical reasoning (for example, federal jury trial
rights).' 9 Other domains turn to longstanding tradition for guidance (for
154. For a catalog of doctrinal tests developed by courts in constitutional cases, see
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 76-101 (2001).
155. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2812-16.
156. Id. at 2813 n.23; see also id. at 2791 ("Some have made the argument, bordering on the
frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second
Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way.").
157. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233 (1993).
158. See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 606, 642 (2008).
159. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
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example, strands of substantive due process).'" Many others are dominated by
judicial precedent and analogical reasoning (for example, speech and abortion
rights)."' Some combine precedent, originalist history, and contemporary
interest balancing (for example, search and seizure jurisprudence).162
Even when common law development of constitutional doctrine
predominates, diversity reappears. Some justices value specific doctrinal rules
over the flexibility of more open-ended standards, while others exhibit the
opposite preference.16 The intensity of judicial review also varies. Sometimes
the Court organizes its thinking around several tiers of scrutiny (for example,
equal protection doctrine). These tiers vary in how important the asserted
regulatory interest must be, and in how tight the connection between that
interest and the regulation under attack must be. Presumptively invalid
regulatory classifications, such as race, receive nondeferential strict scrutiny;" a
few others, including sex, receive intermediate scrutiny;'6 1 mere rational basis
review with extreme deference to policymakers is applied elsewhere.'"
Much free speech precedent has a similar character.'6  But in other fields, this
analytical structure is not apparent. In Eighth Amendment cases, the Court
looks to policy trends across the country and then exercises its own judgment
on whether the punishment in question is cruel under contemporary standards
of decency.'16
Whatever shape Second Amendment doctrine takes in this expanse of
options, the country's experience with judicial review does suggest boundaries
160. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997).
161. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770-74 (2008) (invalidating a campaign
finance regulation by relying on free speech case law and not originalist history); Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929-31 (2000) (invalidating a so-called partial birth abortion law). Davis
was issued on the same day as Heller and was decided by the same 5-4 coalitions. The leading
expositor of common law constitutionalism is David A. Strauss. See David A. Strauss, Common
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996).
162. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-303 (1999).
163. Compare the Court's general balancing test for due process violations, which is a form
of cost-benefit analysis, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976), and its "undue
burden" test in abortion cases, see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874
(1992) (plurality opinion), with its rulings in some federalism cases, which may promote more
specific rules such as a prohibition on "commandeering" state officers, see Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-
Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992).
164. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
165. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982).
166. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
167. See infra Part III.D.
168. In the same term that Heller was decided, Justice Kennedy assessed trends in state
policies regarding the death penalty to adjudicate an Eighth Amendment claim. See Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (invalidating the death penalty for child rape).
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on its influence. First, judicial review cannot be fully detached from politics. If
nothing else, the appointments process connects judicial personnel to organized
interests and elected officials. The course of Second Amendment litigation
depends, in part, on who will judge these cases in the future.
Second, and related, the federal judiciary does not have an impressive
track record in making major policy changes."' Judges might resist the
intense policy preferences of others for a time, but courts are not insulated
in the long run. Thus the Supreme Court could not effectively desegregate
public schools alone, and it did not resist New Deal innovations forever. It bears
repeating that the gun rights movement began outside the courtroom, and
that handgun bans were already quite unpopular at the national level. As
should be apparent from our discussion in Part I, Heller stepped into an
existing regulatory and political structure built up over many years. It did
not discard that structure entirely. As it turns out, the revolution probably
will be televised, but it almost certainly will not be litigated.
We might then predict that Second Amendment litigation will probably
dampen regulatory diversity to some degree, without eliminating existing
gun control within the political mainstream.' Surely the short-term impact
of Heller is a reduction in policy variation by eroding the most assertive end of
the regulatory spectrum. If the case is extended to state and local law,
this effect could be more serious. Local outliers will not be able to sustain
every local preference for strict gun control based on local conditions.
Ill. ON THREATS AND SIDESHOWS TO SOCIAL WELFARE
Heller establishes a limited core right to handgun possession in the home
without necessarily meaning more. Courts could push further, and they have
models for relatively assertive judicial review in other fields. But we doubt that
constitutional litigation will radically change the character of firearms
regulation in the United States. There are few if any examples of judicial
power effectively implementing major social change. Courts tend to work at
the margins of public policy, and Heller does not commit the Supreme Court to
a more aggressive mission. That said, courts could use the Second Amendment
to shape the future of gun control policy in significant ways.
169. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 250-54 (1994) (noting that courts can address only a
small fraction of significant policy disputes); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
170. A similar view is defended by Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller
as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 263-65 (2008).
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Our aim here is to speculate about the path of Second Amendment
litigation to come. We attempt to identify issues that plausibly could be liti-
gated and that could make a serious difference to social welfare based on current
knowledge. It turns out that some hot topics destined for judicial resolution
are of little or uncertain significance to sound and effective regulation of
firearms, while possibly unappreciated constitutional arguments pose real
concerns for social welfare over the longer term.
We begin with a short discussion of incorporation and an inquiry into
whether the elimination of municipal handgun bans is truly a matter of
major concern. We ask the same question regarding the looming litigation
contest over a right to carry handguns in public. Then we turn to potential
challenges that give us greater pause: attacks on a variety of laws and
practices that treat guns as a special category, including excise taxes on
firearms, gun design regulation, and even gun-oriented policing. Finally, we
address the somewhat cloudy relationship between gun rights litigation and
regulatory innovation.
A. Incorporation
Incorporation of Second Amendment norms against state and municipal
action has become a highly salient legal issue after Heller. The Court's
majority mentioned the question,171 and the city of Chicago is currently
resisting incorporation in a lawsuit that challenges its handgun ban.72 It is
a virtual certainty that the Supreme Court will confront the incorporation
issue in the near future.
The significance of incorporation, however, is open to a measure of
debate. Clearly a judicial refusal to enforce Second Amendment norms against
state or local regulation would seriously undercut any practical importance of
Heller and its progeny. The federal government has not been the principal
source of gun control. The political environment has been such that aggressive
gun control efforts tend to occur in a select set of states and cities; the absence
of incorporation would leave those jurisdictions untouched by Second
Amendment norms."
171. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).
172. See supra note 138.
173. One caveat is the possibility that state courts' understanding of state constitutional gun
rights could be influenced by the Supreme Court's understanding of the Second Amendment, regardless
of incorporation, and that the latter understanding could turn out to be expansive. Assessing the
likelihood of this possibility is difficult. Even if the Supreme Court does take an expansive view of
the amendment, state courts need not follow. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 987 P.2d 73, 77 n.1, 78 n.2
(Wash. 1999) (declining to conform state constitutional doctrine to a U.S. Supreme Court opinion on the
1069
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The question is whether a judicial decision in favor of incorporation
would have much greater consequences. But we cannot answer without
knowing how Second Amendment doctrine itself will develop. If Heller is
interpreted narrowly such that only flat handgun prohibitions are declared
invalid, then the impact on gun policy will not be dramatic, regardless of
whether states and municipalities are subject to suit."' Of course judges could
easily expand on Heller's core right, and the mere threat of litigation can
influence policymaking. But the potential impact of incorporation heavily
depends on the as-yet unsettled content of Second Amendment doctrine.
In any event, a fair guess is that the Heller majority is poised to incorporate.
Those five justices reserved the issue, but they gratuitously observed that
nineteenth-century precedents insulating state action had not employed the
Court's more recent approach to incorporation."' In addition, the majority's
rendering of the Second Amendment right was emphatically personal. This
makes it difficult to resist application against the states with an argument
that the amendment was written to protect the militias of those same states.
Moreover, the majority's discussion of Reconstruction Era sources indicates
a belief that those involved in creating the Fourteenth Amendment were
concerned about the gun rights of freed slaves."' This version of history
would allow the Court to link gun rights to an anti-subordination effort
very different from another strut in the individual rights heritage: Dred Scott
v. Sandford."' In addition, if the question is whether the right is sufficiently
"fundamental" to warrant enforcement against all levels of government,
the Heller opinion intimates an affirmative answer.
Fourth Amendment). But cf. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (linking state search and seizure guarantees to
U.S. Supreme Court doctrine).
174. See also infra Part III.B (discussing the limited importance of handgun bans).
175. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23.
176. See id. at 2809-11.
177. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) (opinion of Taney, C.J.) (dictum) (referring to the
right to keep and bear arms in a list of unconstitutional federal "powers ... in relation to rights of
person" (quoted in Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff'd sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)).
178. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (regarding jury trial rights in
criminal cases). Note that the plaintiffs challenging Chicago's handgun ban are asking the courts to
reconsider the narrow understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause
in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), in addition to arguing for incorporation
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Plaintiffs' Motion to Narrow Legal
Issues at 4-5, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-CV-3645 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.chicagoguncase.com/wp-contentfuploads/2008/10/motionnarrowlegalissues.pdf.
179. Cf. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798 ("By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had
become fundamental for English subjects.").
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Finally, the Court could incorporate without totally repudiating Presser v.
Illinois,80 a key precedent in this area. The case rejected a gun rights claim
under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, but it involved state restrictions
on unauthorized military organizations parading as such.'"' This claim is far
different from the demilitarized vision of gun rights endorsed in Heller. It seems
that Presser comes out the same way under Heller regardless of the Court's
position on incorporation-which is another reminder that the stakes of incor-
poration depend on the substance of the right to be enforced.
We cannot know with certainty how today's justices will respond to
arguments on incorporation. The Court has seldom confronted the issue in
recent decades, and it implicates critical judicial choices concerning federalism
and constitutional jurisprudence more generally. But we can still conjecture as
to the plausible substance and impact of Second Amendment rights after
Heller, assuming that incorporation will happen.
B. Handgun Bans
Heller establishes that the current Supreme Court will not tolerate
comprehensive handgun bans when such laws are challenged by citizens
that the Court believes are otherwise entitled to possess handguns for the
purpose of self-defense in the home. The question for us is whether this
judicial commitment matters much, even if it applies against state and local
action and not only the federal government and its enclaves. There are at least
two perspectives from which to respond. The first perspective is political: It
considers the viability of proposed handgun bans among policymakers. The
second perspective assumes the enactment of handgun bans, and considers
the likely consequences of such bans. As far as we can discern from the
available evidence, neither perspective does much to establish the significance
of the handgun ban issue for social welfare.
1. A Political Perspective
Of all the forms that gun control takes in America, comprehensive
handgun bans are among the least popular. This policy has never been an
element of federal law or, it seems, a realistic proposal at the national level.
A handful of municipalities have enacted handgun prohibitions, including
the major metropolises of Chicago and the District of Columbia. But these
180. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
181. See id. at 264-66.
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locations and their political settings are fairly unique. It is possible that the
center of political gravity in other localities is such that handgun bans would
be enacted but for state-level politics that prevent them. In any case, most
states now have preemption legislation or precedent that allocates lawmaking
authority over firearms to state legislatures rather than city councils.'82
Of course, if handguns bans were generally popular, then elevating the
level for gun control policymaking from cities to states would not necessarily
lead to less territory being covered by such bans. But they are not popular,
at least according to recent public opinion polling. In a 2007 Gallup Poll,
68 percent of respondents opposed a handgun ban."' Opposition reached
across several demographic categories. Respondents with postgraduate education
expressed opposition at a 60 percent level, and 57 percent of women over age
fifty were also opposed.'
It is worth emphasizing that litigation threats are an unlikely explanation
for the rarity of handgun bans. Until 2008, Second Amendment arguments
were ineffectual in courts, and state constitutional adjudication was not radically
more inhibiting.' Handgun bans have been unpopular with policymakers for
other reasons. From what we can gather, the political resistance to handgun
bans is not the result of a well-organized gun rights minority blocking the
preferences of a dispersed majority. This public choice story might fit the resis-
tance to other gun-control proposals-some of which show national majority
support in pollingl8-but it is probably a weak explanation for the rarity of
handgun prohibitions.'
There is a notable qualification here. Political environments are not
stable over the long term and so there is no guarantee that popular preferences
regarding handgun regulation are fixed. Demand for more aggressive legislation
in urban areas could develop over time, at least in the absence of serious
182. See Beckman, supra note 90; see also Sippel v. Nelder, 101 Cal. Rptr. 89, 89-90 (Ct.
App. 1972) (invalidating a San Francisco handgun permitting system in favor of state law).
183. See GALLUP POLL SOCIAL SERIES: CRIME 252 (2007) (question 21).
184. See id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 170, at 252 (asserting that "national opposition to
a ban on handguns has been larger and more consistent in recent years").
185. See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982)
(upholding a local operative handgun ban against Second Amendment, Ninth Amendment, and
state constitutional claims); Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 278-79 (11.
1984) (rejecting a claim under a qualified state constitutional right to keep and bear arms).
186. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 1 (showing support for a variety of gun regulations).
187. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is an unorganized majority in
some states that would prefer greater decentralization in gun control policymaking, but that is
blocked by a better organized gun rights movement.
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litigation threats.'? Constitutional litigation has the potential to inhibit
those political changes, certainly at the margins and possibly beyond. For
some observers, this lock-in effect is desirable. But regardless of one's ideologi-
cal predispositions on firearms regulation, Heller and its incorporation
against municipal action might be important insofar as courts could drive a
wedge between emerging political preferences and valid law. We discuss
the chilling effects on policy innovation below.
2. A Policy Consequence Perspective
Even if judicial doctrine ultimately stands against handgun bans enacted
by any level of government, one can ask whether these formal laws have
much impact on social welfare. An effective judicial campaign to eliminate
certain types of legislation is not necessarily a matter of serious concern if
the targeted legislation is ineffectual. If, however, such legislation tends to
reduce the prevalence of handgun ownership by raising the costs of acquisition,
even if acquisition remains possible, then the question becomes how
handgun ownership is. related to crime and public health. There has been
considerable research on this relationship.
a. Gun Prevalence, Crime, and Public Health
Firearms are the most lethal of the widely available weapons deployed
in assaults, robberies, and self-defense. They are the great equalizer. With a
gun, most anyone can threaten or inflict grave injury on another, even
someone with greater skill, strength, and determination. With a gun, unlike
a knife, one individual can kill another quickly, at a distance, on impulse.
The logical and documented result is that, when a gun is present in an
assault or robbery, the victim is more likely to die. It is not only the assailant's
intent that determines the outcome, but also the means of attack. This
conclusion regarding instrumentality has been demonstrated in a variety of
ways and is no longer controversial among social scientists."' Thus widespread
188. The Village of Morton Grove, which apparently enacted the first comprehensive
municipal handgun prohibition, repealed its law after opponents filed suit in the wake of Heller.
See Robert Channick, Morton Grove's Historic Gun Ban Ends: Village's Law Falls to High Court
Ruling, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2008 ("Fighting in court to try to keep the law would cost money the
village does not have, officials said.").
189. See Cook, supra note 11, at 18-19; William Wells & Julie Homey, Weapon Effects and
Individual Intent to Do Harm: Influences on the Escalation of Violence, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 265, 287-
92 (2002); Franklin E. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
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gun use in violent crime intensifies violence, increasing the case-fatality rate.
The United States is exceptional with respect to violent crime not because
we have so much more of it, but because widespread gun availability and
use means that our violence is so much more deadly than that of other
Western nations.19o
The likelihood that a gun will be used in crime is closely linked to the
general availability of guns, and especially handguns. In jurisdictions where
handgun ownership is common, the various types of transactions by which
youths and criminals become armed are facilitated. The list of transactions
includes thefts from homes and vehicles, loans to family members and
friends, and off-the-books sales. In an area with a high-prevalence of gun
ownership, then, transactions in the secondary market are subject to less
friction and may well be cheaper than in markets where gun ownership is
rare.19' While there is no evidence that gun prevalence affects the rate of
violent crime, gun prevalence does have a demonstrable effect on the likelihood
that the assailants in robbery and assault will be armed with guns, resulting
in a higher case-fatality rate than would otherwise occur.19
Research on the effects of gun prevalence has been facilitated by the
discovery of a useful proxy: the percentage of suicides committed with
guns.' It allows us to analyze how gun use relates to the prevalence of gun
ownership across states, or even counties. This proxy has been used to
document a strong positive relationship between county gun prevalence
and each of the following outcomes: the fraction of robberies involving
guns; the fraction of homicides with guns; the likelihood that young men
carry a gun; and, most important, the overall homicide rate.'94 Considerable
care was taken in these studies to establish that the relationship was causal,
although in the absence of experimental evidence there necessarily remains
721, 735-37 (1968); Franklin E. Zimring, The Medium Is the Message: Firearm Caliber as a
Determinant of Death From Assault, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 97 (1972).
190. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 51, 106-13 (1997) (comparing the United States with other
developed nations in terms of violence, both life threatening and not).
191. See Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, Sudhir Venkatesh & Anthony A. Braga, Underground
Gun Markets, 117 ECON. J. F588, F589-90 (2007) (focusing on Chicago, emphasizing policing
practices, and collecting survey data from other cities).
192. See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 32, at 34, 35-36 (citing Philip J. Cook, The Effect of
Gun Availability on Robbery and Robbery Rates: A Cross Section Study of 50 Cities, 3 POL'Y STUD.
ANN. REV. 743, 743-81 (1979)).
193. See Azrael et al., supra note 16; Gary Kleck, Measures of Gun Ownership Levels for
Macrolevel Crime and Violence Research, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 8 (2004).
194. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Does Gun Prevalence Affect Teen Gun Carrying After
All?, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 36 (2004); Cook & Ludwig, supra note 10, at 387-88 (connecting the
proxy for county-level gun prevalence to overall homicide rates).
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some doubt. The bulk of the evidence at this point suggests more prevalent
handgun ownership engenders more widespread use of guns in crime as well
as higher social costs of crime.
From a public health perspective, a concern for the effects of gun preva-
lence on suicide is as important as the effect on homicide. In fact, gun
suicide is more common than gun homicide, although it seems fair to say that
the threat of suicide does not have the same broad effects on quality of life as
does the threat of violent crime. The assertion that gun availability influences
the suicide rate may be questioned on the grounds that, unlike in the case of
assault, someone who wishes to commit suicide has a choice of alternative
mechanisms that can be equally as effective as a gunshot. Nonetheless,
in the United States a majority of suicides are committed with guns, while
guns are involved in only a small fraction of unsuccessful suicide attempts.
Those determined to kill themselves can find a way; but, for those attempting
suicide on impulse, the lethality of readily available and psychologically
acceptable weapons appears to matter. A recent review of the evidence by
Matthew Miller and David Hemenway collects numerous case control studies
comparing gun-owning households to observably similar households without
guns, as well as ecological research pointing to the same conclusion.' While
this empirical research helps make the case, it is the logic and descriptive
information on suicide that is most compelling to us.
If an ultimate consequence of Heller is increased handgun ownership in
some jurisdictions, these likely effects on violent crime and suicide may be
viewed as tangential to the intended effect of the decision-to safeguard the
right of trustworthy householders to defend their home against intruders. In
that light, perhaps the most relevant consequences of increased gun prevalence
are the effect on residential burglary rates and home-invasion rates. Unfortu-
nately we have no reliable data on the frequency with which householders
actually do use a gun to defend against home invasion, or with what degree
of success. Certainly it happens, but how frequently remains a mystery. Survey
data do not provide a reliable basis for finding the answer because self-reports of
these events are unreliable. Moreover, the estimated frequencies differ by an
order of magnitude, perhaps depending on how the questions are asked.'
195. See Mark Duggan, Guns and Suicide, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME
AND VIOLENCE, supra note 89, at 41, 41; Matthew Miller & David Hemenway, Guns and Suicide in
the United States, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 989, 990 (2008); Matthew Miller et al., Household
Firearm Ownership and Rates of Suicide Across the 50 United States, 62 J. TRAUMA, INJ., INFECTION
& CRITICAL CARE 1029 (2007).
196. See HEMENWAY, supra note 45, at 66-69 (pointing to a large difference between
assertions of some gun proponents and results from the National Crime Victimization Survey,
which posed open questions to people who had actually reported an incident).
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However, we can estimate the influence of gun prevalence on burglary
rates and patterns. One study, which used a variety of data sets and methods,
concluded that the prevalence of gun ownership in a county is positively
related to the burglary rate.'17 This association does not appear spurious, but
rather most likely results from an inducement effect. Other things equal, resi-
dential burglary tends to be more profitable in communities where guns are
likely to be part of the available loot. The rate of "hot" burglaries
(break-ins of occupied homes) is also positively related to gun prevalence,
although the effect is small.'
Let us review the chain of logic. To the extent that Heller and subsequent
Court decisions make handguns cheaper and more readily available in some
jurisdictions, those jurisdictions will likely experience an increase in demand
for handguns and ultimately an increase in the prevalence of ownership. An
increase in ownership prevalence will in turn make guns more readily available
to criminals, thereby increasing gun use in violent crime and suicide, resulting
in an increased death rate from intentional violence. Burglary rates are also
likely to increase as burglary becomes more lucrative. But as it turns out, the
first link in that chain-the connection between invalidating handgun bans
and increased prevalence of handgun ownership-is the weakest empirically.
It requires further discussion.
b. Will Handgun Prevalence Increase in the District?
The District of Columbia's ban on handgun acquisitions was enacted in
1976. But, by the late 1980s, the notion that the ban had achieved anything
useful seemed unlikely, given common references to the city as the "murder
capital of the country."'" Of course we do not know how high the homicide
rate spike would have been in the absence of the ban. Yet there is good evi-
dence that the ban was ineffective in preventing members of the public from
arming themselves during the turbulence of the 1980s.
In fact, homicides and suicides declined by approximately 25 percent
around the time of the ban, led by reductions in homicides and suicides
with guns oo-before the tsunami of violence stemming from the introduction
197. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns and Burglary, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY:
EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 89, at 74, 76.
198. See id. at 102-04.
199. Matthew Cella, Murder Rate Raises Concern, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at BO. But
ef. Vance Garnett, Op-Ed, Homicide: Will the Shake-Up Help?, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at
C08 (asserting that Newsweek coined the term with respect to D.C. in 1941).
200. See Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and
Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1615, 1616-17 (1991).
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of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s. Still controversial is the issue of how
much of this decline can be attributed to the handgun ban rather than
other factors.
In an influential article published in the New England Journal of Medicine,
criminologist Colin Loftin and his colleagues showed that, following the ban,
homicides and suicides declined in Washington, D.C., and by a greater margin
than in the city's Maryland and Virginia suburbs.20' A challenge to the use of
affluent suburbs as a control group for the city202 prompted additional research
using Baltimore data. Like the District, Baltimore also experienced a decline in
firearm homicides around 1976. But unlike the District, Baltimore experienced
a reduction in both non-gun and gun homicides, suggesting some general
change in Baltimore during this time period that was not specific to guns.
Further, Baltimore did not experience a decline in gun suicides.zo3
It is interesting, then, to analyze gun-ownership rates in the District of
Columbia and Baltimore during this period. Figure 1 tracks the proxy for gun
ownership from the period before the District's ban was enacted until the end
of the 1990s. The rate jumps up in the late 1980s, just as the crack epidemic
was pushing up criminal violence-but Baltimore had quite a different
trajectory during that time. Gun ownership has declined in the District since
the early 1990s, and in recent years has dropped lower than when the ban was
initiated in 1976 (and far lower than the national average). Perhaps the lesson
from the early years is that a ban in a small jurisdiction with porous borders is
difficult to enforce, especially in the face of broad concern caused by a major
crime epidemic. Oddly, this may be good news for the District: It suggests that
the removal of the handgun ban may have little effect, standing alone, on the
prevalence of handgun ownership.
The data hint at a similar pattern in Chicago, home to the other notable
handgun ban susceptible to legal challenge following Heller. In 1982,
Chicago essentially banned private ownership of handguns, with a grandfa-
ther exception enabling those already in possession of handguns to register
them with the city. Figure 2 shows that our proxy for gun ownership in all of
Cook County declined somewhat during a brief period after the city's ban
was enacted, but then reverted to pre-ban levels." Whether the numbers
201. See id.
202. See Chester L. Britt et al., A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law: Some Cautionary Notes on the
Use of Interrupted Time Series Designs for Policy Impact Assessment, 30 L. & Soc'Y REv. 361 (1996).
203. See David McDowall et al., Using Quasi-Experiments to Evaluate Firearms Laws:
Comment on Britt et al's Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 381 (1996).
204. See also Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Effects of the Brady Act on Gun Violence, in
GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 283, 294 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003).
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in Chicago proper followed the same pattern is unknown; the city has
only about half of the county's suicides.os
In sum, the effect of these local handgun bans on the prevalence of
gun ownership is uncertain, although there is some indication that it has
not been large. This does not mean that these and other interventions have no
effect on the prices and availability of guns. Fortunately, the underground gun
market in Chicago does not work well, and young people and criminals tend
to have a difficult time obtaining a gun if they are not gang members.o' The
handgun ban and the ban on licensed dealers in that city may contribute to
these frictions. But available data leads us to question whether judicial
invalidation of (weakly enforced) handgun bans would seriously threaten
social welfare. The general political hostility to such prohibitions adds to
our skepticism. It is therefore plausible that the most obvious implication
of Heller for formal law has little significance for sound and politically
feasible gun control.
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF SUICIDES COMMITTED WITH GUNS IN WASHINGTON,
D.C., AND BALTIMORE, MARYLAND207
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205. See ILL. CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, ILL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, VITAL
STATISTICS ILLINOIS 2002, at 95, 127 (2006), available at http://www.idph.state.il.us/pdf/
2002 Vital Statistics Illinois.pdf.
206. See Cook et al., supra note 191, at F598, F601-02.
207. Figure 1 presents five-year averages for the percentage of suicides committed with guns,
a proxy for household gun ownership rates. See supra notes 193-194.
HeinOnline  -- 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1078 2008-2009
Gun Control After Heller 1079
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF SUICIDES COMMITTED WITH GUNS IN COOK COUNTY
AND IN THE REST OF ILLINOIS.
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C. Public Places and Concealed Carry
In addition to the issues of incorporation and municipal handgun bans,
Second Amendment litigation will likely address a right to carry weapons in
public places. Whether otherwise qualified gun owners should be entitled
to carry firearms beyond their homes and into generally accessible locations,
including a right to carry concealed firearms, has been on the policy agenda
for more than a century. The Supreme Court, in dicta from 1897, indicated
that the Second Amendment does not protect concealed carry."
But this suggestion might be reconsidered or left narrow by reliance on
Heller's self-defense theme. It could be argued that protecting oneself from
violence in high-crime areas is no more important within the home than
out in the open. True, this argument runs into some of Heller's hedging on
handgun rights. During its discussion of limits on Second Amendment
rights, the majority opinion observed that nineteenth-century state court
208. Figure 2 presents five-year averages for the percentage of suicides committed with guns,
a proxy for household gun ownership rates. See supra notes 193-194.
209. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) ("Thus, the freedom of speech
and of the press (article 1) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent
articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation; the right of the
people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons .... ).
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cases had usually rejected constitutional claims to a right of concealed
carry.210 Elsewhere, however, the majority noted some nineteenth-century
judicial support for a right to unconcealed pistols.2 H Part of that jurisprudence
is, to put it politely, unrelated to modem forms of public policy analysis, but
it does suggest that gun rights can extend into public places without includ-
ing concealed carry. Thus an 1850 decision from Louisiana lauded "a manly
and noble defence" with unconcealed weapons while disparaging "secret
advantages and unmanly assassinations" with concealed weapons.21
However the courtroom arguments about gun rights in public (or
manliness) might play out in the twenty-first century, our question is whether
one result would have significantly different consequences from another. It
is certainly true that permit systems of some kind are a politically viable form
of gun control in many jurisdictions. Indeed, almost all states require that
legal gun owners obtain a permit to carry a concealed firearm in public,
although over time a growing number of states have relaxed their requirements
for issuing such permits.213 What would it mean to social welfare if otherwise
qualified citizens possessed a federal constitutional right to carry guns in
public, whether openly in a holster or concealed on their person? What if
this right were subject to approval through a permit system? There is no
uncontroversial answer to these questions, especially in light of the different
forms that a right to public carry might take. But we can present salient
arguments and existing empirical data.2 4
210. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008).
211. See id. at 2809, 2818.
212. State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850).
213. See John A. Dvorak, Concealed Weapons Laws Taking Hold, Broadening Across U.S.,
KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 2, 2002 (Domestic News).
214. It is possible that law enforcement officers' stop-and-frisk authority would be curtailed
if the courts established a right to carry concealed weapons in public. Police officers might have
more difficulty establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support a stop. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After
Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs,
41 URB. LAW. 1, 37-48 (2009) (raising concerns about the potential effects of an extension of
Heller). However, Terry stops might often be justified on alternative grounds not necessarily
related to illegal gun possession, such as suspicion of drug crimes or even curfew violations. Before
confidently predicting the implications of extending Heller for stop-and-frisk tactics, we need to
know how often alternative grounds for a stop are available, and whether substantive criminal law
might be expanded to generate those grounds. These kinds of adjustments would not be shocking
in the field of law enforcement. In any event, the officer safety justification for the stop-and-frisk
doctrine seems adequate to preserve pat downs and weapons seizures during certain police-citizen
encounters regardless of whether police suspect unlawful or lawful gun possession. See Terry, 392
U.S. at 23-24, 29-30. Nor should we assume that, if Heller were extended to public places, Terry
doctrine will remain static. However, a remaining hitch for police officers might be their
authority to keep seized weapons at the end of a street encounter if the citizen is not arrested,
lawfully possesses the firearm, and asks for the weapon back on the spot. These interchanges
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Those who wish to encourage gun carrying in public places by private
parties argue that the increased likelihood of encountering an armed victim
will deter criminals. This possibility receives some support from prisoner
surveys: 80 percent of prisoners in one survey agreed with the statement
that "a smart criminal always tries to find out if his potential victim is
armed."' But the same data also raise the possibility that an increase in
gun carrying could prompt an arms race. Two-thirds of prisoners incarcerated
for gun offenses reported that the chance of running into an armed victim
was very or somewhat important in their own choice to use a gun.21
Currently, criminals use guns in only about 25 percent of noncommercial
robberies and 5 percent of assaults."' If increased gun carrying among
potential victims causes criminals to carry guns more often themselves,
or become quicker to use guns to avert armed self-defense, the end result
could be that street crime becomes more lethal.1
In a provocative series of research papers and books, economist John Lott
has argued that the deterrent effects of moving from restrictive to permissive
gun-carrying laws dominate."' On the other side economist John Donohue
argues that, while Lott's analysis improves on previous research on this topic,
Lott's findings cannot support the conclusion that ending restrictive concealed-
carry laws reduces crime.220 Donohue's re-analysis of the Lott data indicates
that states that eventually ended restrictive concealed-carry laws had systemati-
cally different crime trends from the other states even before these law changes
might be risky for police officers, and yet a right to demand immediate return of the weapon could
follow from a broad view of the Second Amendment.
215. WRIGHT & Rossi, supra note 27, at 145.
216. See id. at 147.
217. See MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VicriMIzATIoN, 2007, at 6
(2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv07.pdf (reporting, as well, that offenders
used firearms in 7.1 percent of all violent crimes in 2007).
218. The policy analysis is complicated by the choice between rights to carry concealed as
opposed to unconcealed weapons outside the home. If people have a right to carry handguns in public
but the government mandates unconcealed carry for those who choose to do so, then potential
aggressors would receive reliable information regarding which would-be victims are most vulnerable.
Not seeing a handgun would be closer to knowing that a person is not carrying one. Of course, it could
be that unconcealed carry mandates cannot be effectively enforced. Nevertheless, such a regime of
rights and regulations (public carry with mandatory nonconcealment) could be meaningfully different from
a regime in which people have a legal right to choose whether or not to conceal the handguns that they
choose to carry in public (public carry with optional concealment)--or in which government mandates
concealment for any person otherwise entitled to possess a handgun in public (public carry with
mandatory concealment). Each combination probably has different informational effects.
219. See Lorr, supra note 78, at 115; John R. Lott & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deten-ence
and Right-To-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997).
220. See John J. Donohue, The Impact of Concealed-Carry Laws, in EVALUATING GUN
POLICY: EFFECTs ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 89, at 287, 289-90.
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went into effect. The tendency to adopt the law under study following an
unusual spike in crime-which would ordinarily be followed by a reduction
regardless of whether a new law were passed-makes the analysis problematic.
Indeed, Donohue finds much evidence in support of the view that these laws
increased crime rates in the 1990s, when crime was generally declining.221
Hence the estimated treatment effect may be attributable to whatever unmeas-
ured factors caused crime trends to diverge before the laws were enacted.
Regardless of who gets the better of this particular debate, we want to
stress the issue of magnitudes. Whether the net effect of relaxing concealed-
carry laws is to increase or reduce the burden of crime, there is good reason to
believe that the net is not large. One study found that in twelve of the
sixteen permissive concealed-carry states studied, fewer than 2 percent of adults
had obtained permits to carry concealed handguns.222 And the actual
change in gun-carrying prevalence will be smaller than the number of permits
issued would suggest, because many of those who obtain permits were already
carrying guns in public. 223 Moreover, the change in gun carrying appears to be
concentrated in rural and suburban areas where crime rates are already
relatively low, among people who are at relatively low risk of victimization-
white, middle-aged, middle-class males. 224 The available data about permit
holders also imply that they are at fairly low risk of misusing guns, consistent
with the relatively low arrest rates observed to date for permit holders.25
Based on available empirical data, therefore, we expect relatively little
public safety impact if courts invalidate laws that prohibit gun carrying outside
the home, assuming that some sort of permit system for public carry is
allowed to stand. The result would most likely be a modest change in gun
carrying rates among a subset of the population that is itself at relatively low
risk of either committing gun crimes or being victimized by them. Of course, we
cannot confidently predict that a judicially enforceable right to public carry
would not change the composition of those who carry guns in public; and the
221. See id. at 312-13. See generally Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue, Shooting Down the "More
Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003).
222. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 11, at 725 (citing J.M. Hill, The Impact of Liberalized
Concealed Weapon Statutes on Rates of Violent Crime (1997) (unpublished senior thesis, Duke
University, Public Policy) (on file with authors)).
223. See Gail Robuck-Mangum, Concealed Weapon Permit Holders in North Carolina: A
Descriptive Study of Handgun-Carrying Behavior 40 (1997) (unpublished master's thesis, University of
North Carolina, School of Public Health) (on file with authors).
224. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 11, at 726 (citing Hill, supra note 222).
225. See H. STERLING BURNETT, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, TEXAS CONCEALED
HANDGUN CARRIERS: LAW-ABIDING PUBLIC BENEFACTORS 1 (2000), available at http://www.ncpa.org/
pdfs/ba324.pdf (reporting that concealed carry licensees in Texas had lower arrest rates than the
rest of the population).
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effects on public safety could vary depending on whether any such right
includes the choice to conceal as opposed to openly carry a firearm outside
the home. As well, our analysis would be different if a right to public carry
were coupled with an enlargement of the class of people entitled to acquire
firearms, or if government were not allowed to operate a permit system at
all. Even if the test for issuance is fairly permissive, imposing a permit
requirement might well affect the composition of gun carriers in positive
ways. On the available data, however, the issue of public carry standing
alone seems more likely to be a source of litigation than a serious threat to
social welfare.
D. Gun-Targeted Taxes, Safety Programs, and Policing
Given the discussion above and the Heller majority's apparent commitment
to immunizing much of the existing gun control regime, the stakes of Second
Amendment litigation seem low. But there might be greater threats to
sound public policy in the future.
Our first concern is that courts might someday hold that special regulatory
treatment of firearms is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation.
That is, judges might consider it presumptively problematic that government
action singles out firearms or handguns, and then require a justification so
demanding that reasonably reliable evidence and logic become insufficient
for gun control to survive. Demanding anything resembling mathematical
certainty that a regulation will enhance public safety at acceptable cost
would jeopardize large swaths of existing gun control efforts, and thwart
potential innovation in the future. Everything from gun taxes, to gun
design requirements, to gun safety programs involving permits and licenses,
to gun registration and information collection efforts, to gun-oriented
policing in high-violence neighborhoods could be disrupted-unless regulators
show analogous treatment of other products or otherwise survive skeptical
judicial scrutiny of the program's value.
Nothing in Heller commits the Court to this path, but it would not be
entirely novel in constitutional adjudication. Free speech and free exercise
doctrines include this sort of anti-targeting structure."' In these fields the mod-
ern Court has often concentrated on government action that not only burdens
behavior the justices believe constitutionally valued, but that singles out
such behavior for special disfavor. To be clear, this anti-targeting approach
226. See Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 Nw. U. L. REV.
1291, 1294 (2004).
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does not fit all of First Amendment doctrine. 2 7 Nor is it easy to identify which
forms of regulatory targeting ought to be problematic. This requires a theory.
For instance, the Court has been relatively unconcerned when government
regulates the time, place, or manner of speech without explicitly targeting speech
content, 228 even though such choices can be crucial to speakers and audiences.
Regardless, one must have a justifiable definition of "the freedom of speech"
before one can tell whether regulation targets the phenomenon. It is not at all
obvious how "the right to keep and bear arms" should be fully specified, and
then how the doctrinal categories from free speech or free exercise litigation
might be imported into the gun rights field. It is nevertheless worth raising the
First Amendment analogy. The Heller majority did so in several places.229
Consider in this regard a tributary of speech doctrine that leans hard
against special taxation of the traditional press. In 1983, the Court declared
invalid a state tax on paper and ink used for producing publications, with
exemptions for the first $100,000 worth-even though it appeared that the
complaining newspapers would have paid more under the state's general
sales tax.230 On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly rejected press
claims for exemption from regulation that reaches other industries, despite
the real economic burdens that may be imposed on the media; the Court
grants media operations no constitutional immunity from labor or antitrust
laws that are applicable to other businesses. 3 ' This kind of logic might be
exported to Second Amendment litigation. Indeed, regulatory cost concerns
have already arisen after Heller. Plaintiffs challenging gun control in Chicago
are not only objecting to the city's handgun ban, they also seek invalidation
of a recurring firearms registration and fee requirement.23 2
Now consider the federal excise tax. Since 1919, the federal government
has collected an excise tax on firearms."' This one-time tax on sales now
227. See id. at 1317-18, 1355-71 (identifying situations when claimant conduct matters to
First Amendment doctrine and its functions).
228. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
229. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790-91, 2797, 2799, 2805, 2812, 2817
n.27, 2821 (2008) (connecting First and Second Amendment text, history, and judicial treatment).
230. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 577-79,
588-91 (1983) (expressing concern that judges will not be able to calculate tax burdens); id. at 597-98
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (comparing liability under the sales tax). To be fair to the majority, the sales
tax was not necessarily the correct baseline for comparison. Exemptions to the paper-and-ink tax meant
that only a few large newspapers paid the tax.
231. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103,132-33 (1937).
232. See supra note 138.
233. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 900(10), 40 Stat. 1058, 1122 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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stands at 10 percent of the manufacturer's price for handguns and 11 percent
for long guns.' At least part of this tax is surely passed along to consumers.
Even if a tax burden by itself will not trigger heightened judicial skepticism, a
post-Heller judiciary might nevertheless ask whether a firearms tax law is
special compared to other taxation schemes and whether the government can
explain the differences persuasively. If firearms are taxed like sporting goods,
perhaps judges become passive; but if they are taxed in a unique way, perhaps
judges become inquisitive. It is of course possible for government lawyers to
defend special treatment for firearms by linking their prevalence or misuse to
social harm and to the level of taxation or other regulation in question. But
case outcomes would depend upon what kind of logic judges find most
persuasive and how much evidence they demand to support the regulation.
Taxation can be the product of political opportunity and demand elasticities,
rather than distinctions that a judge deems principled.
If courts are sufficiently demanding of evidentiary support and if they are
sufficiently sensitive to cost increases from firearms regulation, there could be
major losses in social welfare. Minimizing the cost of acquiring firearms
obviously benefits those who sell or enjoy possessing them, but these gains
have attendant threats. One worrisome possibility is that concerned judges
would invalidate experimental gun control efforts or targeted taxation that
nevertheless have a reasonable chance of seriously improving public health
and safety. Furthermore, gun-targeted laws can be designed to offset negative
externalities that empirical study associates with firearms. By one estimate,
keeping a handgun in the home is associated with at least $600 per year in
externalities.235 On the usual logic of corrective taxation, it would make sense
to raise the current firearms tax rate so that handgun owners internalize the
full social costs of their choices.236 Attempts to tax or otherwise regulate
234. See Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, Dep't of the Treasury, Tax and Fee Rate,
http://www.ttb.gov/taxaudit/atftaxes.shtml (last visited May 23, 2009). Ordinary wine is taxed at
only 21 /bottle. See id.
235. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 10, at 390.
236. Liability insurance is an alternative mechanism for the internalization of externalities
associated with gun ownership. A standard homeowners' insurance policy ordinarily covers liability for
accidents involving guns, but often has an exemption for intentional harms, or even for harms
resulting from criminal acts. See Tom Baker & Thomas 0. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the
Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 92, at 292, 299; Tom Baker,
Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AND CULTURAL
PRACTICE (D.M. Engle & M. McCann eds., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1314309. It is not clear how far liability or liability
coverage extends for cases in which the gun is transferred by the owner to someone else, or is
stolen, and then misused. To the best of our knowledge, no states or localities require gun owners
to obtain such insurance. The threat of litigation following Heller could stifle local experiments with
such policies.
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firearms based on estimates of their social costs are threatened by constitu-
tional doctrine that flatly disfavors such special treatment absent conclusive
proof of those social costs. Even information collection systems could be at
237
risk of invalidation.
To economists, the effect of taxation and other requirements on the
price of guns is not just an incidental detail, but rather may have an important
effect on gun sales, use, and misuse. It seems apparent that the most
important health-related outcome likely to come from the cigarette litigation
has been the increase in the price of cigarettes resulting from the financial
settlement with the states. 238  The tax on new guns, though much more
modest proportionally, should also have some effect on demand, reducing
the number of guns and the prevalence of gun ownership by some amount. The
economic logic here rests on the strong presumption that a tax on new guns
will be passed on to the secondary market by restricting the quantity
available from the primary market."' The same price effect can be achieved
by imposing permit fees or by establishing minimum quality standards-as
with the ban on imports of low-quality handguns-or by requiring special
features on new guns, such as locking devices or microstamp capability. But
these initiatives tend to make guns special from a regulatory perspective.
237. The public safety consequence of repealing licensing and registration systems is a bit
unclear based on available evidence. These systems do provide information regarding who owns
which guns, information that could prove useful to law enforcement investigations. The most vivid
example is in the future. The California law requiring pistols sold after 2010 to have micro-stamp
capability will be more useful if the state is allowed to continue handgun registration; the
regulatory combination should help investigators connect shell casings found at the scene of a
crime to the current or recent owner of the gun. Unfortunately, evaluation of existing state-level
licensing and registration systems is forced to rely on weak research designs, yielding evidence for
regulatory impact on immediate output measures but not on outcomes of more direct policy
interest. For example, D.W. Webster et al., Relationship Between Licensing, Registration and Other
Gun Sales Laws and the Source State of Crime Guns, 7 INJ. PREVENTION 184 (2001), finds some
effect of licensing and registration requirements on the fraction of confiscated crime guns that
were first purchased out of state. See id. at 188. How informative this is about the ease with
which criminals can obtain guns, or ultimately the overall rate of gun crime within a community,
is unclear. A study of the federal Brady Act suggests the ability of the secondary gun market to
shift, and at least partially offset, changes to the supply side of the market. After the Brady Act
was enacted, Chicago experienced a large drop in the share of crime guns first sold out of state, yet
the fraction of homicides committed with a gun did not seem to change at all. See Cook & Braga,
supra note 27, at 304-07; Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Pragmatic Gun Policy, in EVALUATING
GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 89, at 1, 21-22.
238. See Frank J. Chaloupka & Kenneth E. Warner, The Economics of Smoking, in 1B
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1539, 1546-56 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse
eds., 2000) (reviewing studies for the proposition that monetary price increases tend to reduce cigarette
demand, despite the product's addictive qualities).
239. See Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, "Perversity, Futility, jeopardy": An Economic Analysis of
the Attack on Gun Control, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1996, at 91,104-05 fig.2.
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We have reason to believe, however, that courts will not aggressively
follow an anti-targeting theme in Second Amendment doctrine. First, for
reasons noted above, judges are unlikely to radically uproot gun control
regardless of the doctrinal forms they adopt. Second, an anti-targeting theme
is not necessarily sensible for the Second Amendment as a matter of lawyers'
logic. It depends on what motivates courts to single out singling out, so to speak.
Part of the motivation derives from a conclusion that an enormous variety
of government action can negatively influence the exercise of constitu-
tionally valued behavior, and that not every adverse effect can or should be
policed by courts.2 4 This limit on judicial ambition does seem equally
applicable to Second Amendment litigation. If mass media must pay property
taxes, and if the Constitution is no barrier to enforcing religiously-neutral
drug laws against religious ritual,"' then it is difficult to see why handguns
cannot validly be subject to a general sales tax or to pre-market approval
from a product safety commission, for example.
The complication arises from the necessity of identifying which forms
of regulatory targeting might be constitutionally troubling. It is not enough
for a court to recognize constitutional value in the private conduct at issue.
Such value is jeopardized whether or not regulators single it out for special
treatment. To enforce an anti-targeting theme while minimizing or ignoring
other government-imposed burdens, judges ought to have a convincing reason
for their skepticism of regulatory targeting itself.
In the free speech field, one might conclude that government regulation
that isolates particular messages for uniquely burdensome treatment is presump-
tively problematic. This could be based on a theory that, say, government
officials are especially likely to use such regulation to entrench their own
power and to freeze the political environment against logical testing and
innovation."' And we might believe that, in general, forcing the political
system to treat communication more like other conduct provides a handy
safeguard. Speakers will thereby have natural allies in the democratic process
who are likewise threatened with regulatory burden.243
240. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and
Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 943 (1993).
241. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889-91 (1990).
242. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 43-44, 80-
86 (1982) (suggesting regulation might be distrusted more than speech is especially valued).
243. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
204-05 (3d ed. 2007). There are other theories that might support anti-targeting themes and yet
still weaken the case for substantial burdens tests; perhaps a targeted burden amounts to a special
form of injury.
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But we have doubts that courts could faithfully translate this logic into
the gun rights domain. We are aware of no convincing theory of just political
power that identifies the gun rights movement as in need of federal judicial
assistance. This movement is anything but a perennial loser in ordinary politics,
and a judicial attempt to multiply allies for the gun lobby would be hard to
justify on a reasonable vision of equitably distributed political influence. One
might believe that existing gun control is too onerous without believing that
the political process is rigged in its favor.
Nor is it clear what special skepticism the judiciary should have when
it comes to firearms regulation. If we focus on Heller's reasoning, the
majority's key concern was handgun possession for self-defense in the home.
But it is doubtful that regulators surreptitiously harbor ill will toward those
hoping to protect themselves against criminal intruders, or that they will
often use firearms regulations as a method for squelching self-defense efforts.
Had Heller emphasized the problem of centralized tyranny, our analysis
would be different. But it did not. The majority's vision for the right was
mainstreamed and demilitarized."' Once the rationale for gun rights moves
away from fear of centralized tyranny and aligns with more mainstream
values, such as preserving self-defense from private criminal assault, judges
would seemingly have less reason to worry that specialized gun regulation is
the first step toward an impermissible end.
This is not to claim that courts have no basis on which to invalidate
firearms regulation beyond comprehensive handgun bans. Our point is that the
path toward an anti-targeting theme in Second Amendment doctrine is
logically challenging. And a substantial burden analysis would yield a pattern
of outcomes that is not easy to predict. Our concern remains that, however
controversial the legal logic, courts will borrow an anti-targeting theme from
elsewhere in constitutional doctrine and then subject nearly all gun control
efforts to substantial judicial review. While we hold to our sense that courts
will not radically revise firearms law in the United States, confirming our
prediction of judicial modesty might be possible only after much litigation-
and with an additional cost in the form of regulatory stasis.
E. Judicial Review and Innovation
This brings us to a more diffuse yet at least equally troublesome risk of
Second Amendment litigation. The Supreme Court's willingness to inject
the judiciary into the gun control arena could have a socially detrimental
244. See supra Part II.A.
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dampening effect on regulatory innovation. This should be of concern to
anyone who believes that gun policy in America has come to an unfortunate
stalemate, and that the future might open political opportunities for novel
regulatory approaches that overcome current ideological cleavages and do
more good than harm.
Granted, constitutional law does not necessarily kill innovation. The
relationships among constitutionalism, judicial review, and regulatory innova-
tion are actually quite complex. One description of constitutional law in the
United States has emphasized entrenchment of old norms against change,
but many observers now recognize that a constitutional order can generate
institutions to make change.245 Judicial review is no different. It might retard
or instigate regulatory innovation, depending on how it is performed. For
example, nonjudicial policymakers might respond to judicial invalidations with
new regulatory approaches in an effort to respect both judicial judgments and
public demands. Just as Roe v. Wade did not end the development of abortion
law, Heller did not end the District of Columbia's gun control efforts."' In
addition, the very substance of constitutional doctrine can mandate periodic
updating in ordinary law. An illustration is Eighth Amendment doctrine's focus
on evolving standards of decency.247 We can imagine a Second Amendment
doctrine that likewise calls for evaluation of gun control according to
contemporary values and circumstances.
But the possibility of constitutional litigation certainly can deter novel
government responses to old or new social problems-and passages in Heller
seem crafted to have this dampening effect. Recall the majority's reliance
on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources for guidance on the Second
Amendment's meaning, its reference to a tradition of prohibiting dangerous
or unusual weapons, and its apparent preference for longstanding gun control
measures."' Even if these forays into originalist history and subsequent
tradition leave readers uncertain about what counts as unacceptable novelty
in gun control, and even if some type of interest balancing was operating in
245. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 153 (1995) ("The American Constitution is an instrument of government,
not an obstacle to government...."); Samaha, supra note 158, at 631-33, 662-67 (discussing
coordination theories of authority for our constitutional text). A provocative argument for
valuing constitutional debate precisely for its ability to combat entrenchment is LOUIS MICHAEL
SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 55, 210-16 (2001). In this regard, consider that Heller effectively disrupted a
status quo in judicial review against Second Amendment claims.
246. See supra note 118.
247. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2664-65 (2008).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 144-152.
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the background, the Court's official rationale looks largely unsympathetic
to policy experimentation. We cannot be certain at this point that fighting
comprehensive handgun bans will exhaust judicial opposition to firearms
regulation. There is now a substantial range of plausible litigation threats
while the Court's position on gun control remains vague. These threats can
prevent policy experiments before they begin.
It might be fair to ask whether the demand for innovative responses to
gun risks is appreciable in the current political environment. One might
believe that the policy rut is too deep for Second Amendment litigation
threats to make much difference. But we believe that policy innovation is
alive in some states and localities. Jurisdictions including California, Maryland,
and Massachusetts have moved forward with new gun control policies in recent
years.249 Relatively innovative ideas include microstamping shell casings for the
purpose of tracing crime guns, reviewing the design of new guns before they hit
the market, and requiring personalized gun technology that attempts to
restrict usage to owners only. Perhaps less mainstream-but nevertheless
intriguing-is the possibility of taxing firearms according to their estimated
social costs, or requiring firearms owners to maintain insurance to cover the
costs of gun misuse by themselves or others. Some such innovation might
be analogized to existing regulation of other commodities, but these ideas
would be new with respect to firearms. A tradition-oriented Second
Amendment doctrine would undercut efforts to introduce them.
Furthermore, the political environment for firearms regulation can
change. Opportunities for new policy rise and fall with such factors as changing
demographics and the salience of gun violence. If the decline in sporting uses
of guns continues to sap NRA membership efforts, if gun crimes and visible
street gang activity spike upward again, and if we witness another Virginia
Tech-style massacre, the politics will likely change. But a tradition-enforcing
form of judicial review can minimize these regulatory opportunities. In fact,
this politically countercyclical role for judicial oversight helps explain the
oddity of 305 members of Congress supporting constitutional litigation against
the District of Columbia, rather than simply voting to override the District's
regulations.250 Heller could help freeze some existing political victories on the
249. See supra Part I.C.1-1.C.4.
250. See supra note 4. It is possible that the Senate's commitment to supermajority votes for
cloture against filibusters led this simple majority of Congress members to prefer constitutional
litigation to ordinary legislation. If so, the shift to litigation is a consequence of the legislators'
own institutional design choices. On constitutional objections to the filibuster, see Adam M.
Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 608-09, 667-68 (2006).
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gun rights side, victories that kept gun control mild and that make Heller look
unimportant at the moment.
Heller might put a brake on new gun control policy through two mecha-
nisms. First, at least some proposals will be debated under a serious threat of
constitutional litigation with its attendant costs for the government. These
costs are not limited to financing an adequate legal defense; losing a Second
Amendment challenge might mean paying damages or attorneys fees to the
claimants. And litigation threats against innovative regulation will remain
strong unless and until Second Amendment doctrine is clarified in relevant
respects. Consider California's cutting edge rule that, beginning in 2010,
semiautomatic pistols must be designed to stamp a serial number on the shell
casing each time a round is fired."' Whether this requirement will pass
constitutional muster is not fully known at the moment, and the issue may
not be settled for many years. Meanwhile, legislators in other states who are
attracted to this idea as a boon to police investigations will have to persuade
the majority that it not only serves the public interest, but that it is worth
the expected cost of defending it in the courts. Even if microstamping is
somehow insulated from serious Second Amendment objections, in some
cases the expected litigation costs will be prohibitive.
The second mechanism is more speculative, but it might be significant.
Heller transformed the notion of personalized Second Amendment rights from
contested to justiciable. The decision could therefore strengthen the rhetorical
arsenal of gun rights supporters, even if these advocates go beyond Heller's
language.252 It is hard to predict the political effect that this shift will have
in practice, but it may be nontrivial. The hopeful view of gun control advocates,
that Heller would open the door to moderate legislation by undercutting the
rhetorical force of the slippery slope argument," is yet to be confirmed and
might be nave.254 On the other hand, the case could ultimately have no
meaningful effect on constitutional argument outside the courts. Second
Amendment objections to gun control predate Heller by decades, and the move-
251. See supra note 88.
252. See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n Inst. for Legislative Action, Supreme Court Declares That the
Second Amendment Guarantees an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms (June 26, 2008),
http://www.nraila.org/heller ("All law-abiding Americans have a fundamental, God-given right to
defend themselves in their homes. Washington, D.C. must now respect that right.").
253. See David M. Kennedy, Op-Ed., After Heller, Reason Can Prevail, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23,
2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id= 1202424712957.
254. Cf. Nat'l Ass'n for Gun Rights, The Ugly Truth About the Heller Decision (July 29,
2008), http://www.nationalgunrights.org/truthaboutheller.shtml (exhorting supporters to fuel pro-
gun lobbying efforts because "liberals are using [Heller] to restrict our gun rights," and criticizing
the decision for recognizing longstanding prohibitions on certain types of gun use).
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ment behind those arguments helps explain the decision rather than the other
way around. In addition, Heller demilitarized the amendment in a way that
preserves key elements of modem gun control. Thus if judicial rhetoric
influences nonjudicial debate, the influence might cut in two directions.
Even if Heller deters the implementation of some number of firearms
policies that are worth trying, there is nevertheless a modest hope for
improved policy quality in the regulation that does go forward. The Supreme
Court intervened late in the development of gun regulation in the United
States, and some might view the current system as dysfunctional. The less
respect one has for gun politics today, the more one might hope that a dose of
judicial oversight will prove net beneficial. The comparison is not between
uninformed judges badly redrafting firearms law and an ideal world of policymak-
ing. In the United States, authority over firearms regulation is often maintained
within state legislatures responsive to the distribution of organized political
power, not in localities sensitive to local conditions or administrative agencies
building expertise on the potential and limits of gun control. And if Second
Amendment doctrine beyond the core right recognized in Heller calls for sober
consideration of rational argument and empirical data, the system of gun
politics and regulation might make progress toward sound policy.
But this hope is no more than modest. The first problem is that we cannot
guarantee that any improvement in policy quality will outweigh the value of
foregone policy experiments. It almost goes without saying that we have more
to learn about the characteristics of effective. gun control that adequately
account for the benefits of gun ownership. Second, judges are, at best, only
marginally better at understanding the complexities of gun policy analysis than
others involved in the system. They are not experts and they are unlikely to
acquire the relevant expertise in short order, even if they act in good faith.
Whether judges are able to incorporate values held by the general public rather
than implement their own personal policy preferences is another serious
question, if the goal is social welfare maximization.
Finally, the post-Heller litigation environment is decidedly asymmetrical.
Gun rights proponents now have an additional method for achieving their
goals, while gun control proponents will ordinarily lack conventional
constitutional arguments to prompt gun regulation. Nonjudicial politics
ultimately preempted many lawsuits against the gun industry, and now the
Supreme Court has made it possible for the gun rights movement to press
further in the other direction with supreme judicial review. To the extent that
Second Amendment litigation prompts deeper and empirically driven evaluation
of firearms regulation, it will come with gun control in a systematically
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defensive posture. We have little confidence that this one-sided drag on policy
innovation can produce sufficient gains to provide a net benefit.
For some, an additional opportunity to veto gun control in the courtroom
will be a welcome change. But a libertarian presumption against government
action is not self-evidently good policy from a social welfare perspective.
And so we remain concerned that the greatest risk to sound public policy
following Heller is among the least visible: an additional background
pressure against novelty in the law of gun control at a time when
experimentation and creative decisionmaking are crucial.
CONCLUSION
Heller begins a new era in the history of gun control. It adds federal
constitutional adjudication to the policymaking environment in a novel
way, without determining much of the future for Second Amendment
doctrine. We have attempted to understand the dimensions and underpinnings
of the decision, and to evaluate its plausible consequences for social welfare.
This perspective and the available data lead us to believe that some obvious
constitutional issues, such as the validity of nonfederal handgun bans and the
entitlement to concealed-carry permits, are not especially threatening. Yet
other possible outcomes, such as judicial skepticism of gun-targeted regulation
or litigation risks that chill regulatory innovation, ought to be matters of serious
concern. Our analysis is itself only a beginning. But one important task after
Heller is to separate true threats from sideshows in the continuing struggle to
reduce crime and violence in America.
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